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ABSTRACT
This dissertation generalizes traditional models of security policies, from specifications of
whether programs are secure, to specifications of how secure programs are. This is a generalization
from qualitative, black-and-white policies to quantitative, gray policies. Included are generalizations
from traditional definitions of safety and liveness policies to definitions of gray-safety and grayliveness policies. These generalizations preserve key properties of safety and liveness, including that
the intersection of safety and liveness is a unique allow-all policy and that every policy can be written
as the conjunction of a single safety and a single liveness policy. It is argued that the generalization
provides several benefits, including that it serves as a unifying framework for disparate approaches
to security metrics, and that it separates—in a practically useful way—specifications of how secure
systems are from specifications of how secure users require their systems to be. To demonstrate
the usefulness of the new model, policies for mitigating injection attacks (including both codeand noncode-injection attacks) are explored. These policies are based on novel techniques for
detecting injection attacks that avoid many of the problems associated with existing mechanisms
for preventing injection attacks.

v

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Computer-security policies have traditionally been modeled as predicates, partitioning the
secure from the insecure system behaviors. Policies partition behaviors by specifying constraints
like “only administrators may write to files”, “packets destined for port 120 must be logged”, or
“all array accesses must be bounds-checked”. These are qualitative, black-and-white constraints
that can be used to decide whether a given system is secure.
This dissertation generalizes the qualitative, black-and-white model of policies to a quantitative, gray model. Instead of specifying whether systems are secure, gray policies specify how
secure systems are. For example, a gray policy for array-bounds checking might consider that checking every array access makes a program 100% secure and that each unchecked access decimates a
program’s current rating.
Gray policies are useful because users are often unwilling to pay the costs required to
achieve 100% security according to some policy. As is well understood, enforcement costs can be
high, typically in the form of:
1. performance overhead (e.g., due to increased runtime checks),
2. code-size overhead (e.g., due to inlined monitoring code),
3. decreased usability (e.g., due to authentication procedures), and
4. consumption of other system resources (e.g., due to security checks draining batteries or
security logs draining file-system space).
To make an analogy with the physical world, safes are not rated as secure or insecure, but
rather by the estimated amount of time needed to penetrate them with a given set of tools. Such
1

a quantitative rating enables consumers to weigh the security metric against other metrics, such
as size, weight, price, and availability, when choosing a safe to buy. Importantly, a choice made in
one context may differ from a choice made in another context, depending on the priorities of the
purchaser and resources available.
In this dissertation’s framework, a gray policy specifies a system’s security rating, while a
silhouette judge specifies a user’s security requirements. Returning to the safe analogy, a silhouette
judge is like a consumer’s purchasing-decision algorithm that inputs a safe’s security rating and,
combining it with the safe’s other attributes, outputs a buy or don’t-buy decision.
Thus, this dissertation’s framework separates the intuitively distinct specifications of how
secure systems are (gray policies) from how secure users require their systems to be (silhouette
judges). This separation enables users with different security requirements to use the same gray
policy in different ways, by specifying different silhouette judges. For example, in the context of
high-performance systems research users might require 0% security (e.g., no array-bounds checking),
while in the context of flight-navigation software users might require 100% security.
There are additional benefits of the gray model over the black-and-white model. Gray
policies enable users to compare the security of different systems when choosing which to use. In
the black-and-white model, a user who can’t afford to run a “secure” web browser has to choose
between other browsers only known to be “insecure”; in the gray model, the same user could
choose the most secure of the affordable browsers. As another potential benefit, consumers often
base purchasing decisions on measurable attributes, so quantifying security could drive demand for
security improvements, even ones that degrade performance by 10–20% or more, thus countering
the arguments of some developers that such security overheads are intolerable [48].

1.1

Roadmap
This dissertation combines and extends ideas first presented in earlier research papers [94,

95, 96]. It concerns the previously unrelated fields of formal security policies, quantified security
metrics, and code-injection attacks, and is organized in the following manner:

2

1. Chapter 2 presents a new, quantified model of formal security policies. This model generalizes existing definitions of policies, properties, safety, liveness, hypersafety, and hyperliveness. It is shown that the new model is indeed a generalization, in that every black-andwhite policy is also a gray policy, every black-and-white safety property is also a gray safety
property, etc.
2. Chapter 3 shows how this dissertation’s model of gray policies can serve as a unifying
framework for many disparate approaches to security metrics, and how gray policies might
be constructed from various security metrics, as well as existing black-and-white policies.
3. Chapter 4 delves into the problem of injection attacks, a pervasive threat to software security. Problems with existing techniques for preventing injection attacks are investigated,
and new techniques which avoid these problems are presented. The novel techniques are
then used to construct gray policies and silhouette judges to mitigate and prevent injection
attacks.
4. Chapter 5 concludes.
In lieu of having a single related work section to cover all of these subtopics, the related works for
each topic are discussed in their respective chapters.

3

CHAPTER 2
FROM BLACK-AND-WHITE TO GRAY POLICIES

The idea to quantify security is not new (e.g., [25, 75, 4, 31, 54, 46, 78]).
However, the extensive research into general-purpose models of policies has considered them
to be predicates and therefore black and white (e.g., [101, 43, 64, 35, 37, 30]). Many interesting
results have come from these qualitative models of policies, including definitions of safety and
liveness properties, which are tied to particular classes of enforcement mechanisms, and proofs that
every black-and-white property is the conjunction of one safety property and one liveness property.
This chapter1 contributes a more general, quantitative model of policies and properties, and
demonstrates that the existing results of the black-and-white model carry through into the gray
model.

2.1

Gray Policies
Policies reason about systems, which execute events. Let E be a non-empty, countable set

of events, with metavariable e ranging over individual events. Intuitively, E is the system API and
might contain instructions for manipulating system resources.
A system trace, or execution, x, is a possibly infinite sequence of pairs of events called
exchanges. The events in an exchange he, e0 i indicate
1. an event e the system attempts to execute, and
2. an event e0 that actually executes.
1

The ideas and much of the text in this chapter first appeared in [96]. Permission to use this material is in
Appendix A.
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For example, the trace:

hsti(0, 0x9ABC), sti(0, 0x1ABC)i hrdr(4, 0x8F F F ), rdr(4, 0x0F F F )i

indicates that the target system being reasoned about, for example an application program, attempted to store the immediate value 0 at memory address 0x9ABC, but 0 was instead written
at address 0x1ABC, due to the involvement of a runtime mechanism such as a virtual-memory
manager. The second exchange in the trace also shows involvement of a runtime mechanism, again
decreasing the memory address being accessed by 215 .
This model of traces as sequences of exchanges is general, in part because it clarifies the
effects of runtime mechanisms; such clarification improves expressiveness [65, 37]. In cases where
policies require no runtime support, such as statically enforced policies, the first and second events
in exchanges will be the same.
Some additional notation will be useful. A set of events E determines the set of possible
exchanges E. Given exchange set E, E ∗ denotes the set of all finite executions (i.e., finite sequences
of exchanges), E ω denotes the set of all infinite executions, and E ∞ denotes the set of all finite and
infinite executions. Also, x  y and y  x mean that execution x ∈ E ∗ is a prefix of execution
y ∈ E ∞ . Finally, shorthand quantifications will be used in formulae; for example, ∃x  y : F means
∃x ∈ E ∗ : (x  y ∧ F ), while ∀x  y : F means ∀x ∈ E ∞ : (x  y ⇒ F ).

2.1.1

Policies and Properties
The black-and-white model defines policies P as predicates over target systems; the policy

returns a yes-no response to a given target system, to indicate whether that system is secure [101].
A target system X is modeled as the set of executions it can produce, for example, all possible
runs of an application program. Hence, on a system with exchange set E, X is a subset of E ∞ , or,
equivalently, a predicate over target systems.
∞

Definition 1 ([101]). A black-and-white policy is a P : 2E → {f alse, true}.

5

The gray model defines policies G as functions mapping target systems not to false/true
values, but to a real number between 0 and 1, with greater numbers indicating higher security.
Gray policies generalize black-and-white policies because false/true values in the black-and-white
model can always be encoded as 0/1 values in the gray model.
∞

Definition 2. A gray policy is a G : 2E → R[0,1] .
In the black-and-white model, properties are policies that place no constraints on the relationships between executions [101]. It can be determined whether a target system satisfies a
property by examining each possible trace in isolation; if every trace is valid in isolation (according
to some predicate p over individual traces), then the policy as a whole is satisfied.
Definition 3 ([101]). A policy P is a black-and-white property iff ∃ (p : E ∞ → {f alse, true}) :
∀X ⊆ E ∞ : P (X) = (∀x ∈ X : p (x)) .
The gray model also considers a policy to be a property when the policy’s value for a given
a set of executions can be determined by examining each execution in isolation. While the blackand-white model determines the policy’s value P (X) as the conjunction of the values of p(x), for
all x ∈ X, the gray model determines the policy’s value G(X) as the infimum (inf) of the values of
g(x), for all x ∈ X. Here g, like p, is a function over individual traces.

Definition 4. A policy G is a gray property iff ∃ g : E ∞ → R[0,1] : ∀X ⊆ E ∞ : G (X) = inf{g (x) |
x ∈ X}.
Gray properties generalize black-and-white properties because the conjunction of a set of
false/true values always equals the infimum of a set of corresponding 0/1 values. Unfortunately, the
use of the infimum precludes limiting the range of security values in the gray model to computable
reals; computable reals are not closed under infimum operations [106].
It is often convenient to identify a property by the individual-trace function (p or g) it
uses. The following propositions show that there is no ambiguity in doing so, due to the one-to-one
correspondence between a p or g function and the property it induces.
Proposition 1. There is a one-to-one correspondence between a black-and-white property P and
its trace-predicate p.
6

Proof. First, it is proved that every trace-predicate corresponds to exactly one black-and-white
property. Assume there exists a trace predicate p such that p corresponds to two different blackand-white properties P and P 0 . By the definition of a property, P (X) = (∀x ∈ X : p(x)) = P 0 (X),
so for all X, P (X) = P 0 (X). Thus P and P 0 are the same property, a contradiction.
Next, it is proved that no black-and-white property has more than one trace predicate.
Assume there exists a black-and-white property P and two different trace predicates p and p0 such
that for all X ⊆ E ∞ , P (X) = (∀x ∈ X : p(x)) = (∀x ∈ X : p0 (x)). Consider the set of all target
systems that only produce a single execution {{x} | x ∈ E ∞ }. For each target system T in this set,
P (T ) holds if and only if ∀t ∈ T : p(t) and ∀t ∈ T : p0 (t). Since each target system T only contains
a single execution x, p(x) = p0 (x) for all traces. Thus p and p0 are the same trace predicate, a
contradiction.
Proposition 2. There is a one-to-one correspondence between a gray property G and its gray
function g.
Proof. First, it is proved that every gray function induces exactly one gray property. Assume there
exists a gray function g such that g induces two different gray properties G and G0 . By the definition
of a gray property, G(X) = inf{g(x) | x ∈ X} = G 0 (X), so for all X, G(X) = G 0 (X). Thus G and
G0 are the same property, a contradiction.
Next, it is proved that no gray property has more than one gray function g. Assume that
there exists a gray property G and two different gray functions g and g 0 such that for all X ⊆ E ∞ ,
G(X) = inf{g(x) | x ∈ X} = inf{g 0 (x) | x ∈ X}. Consider the set of all targets that only produce
a single execution {{x} | x ∈ E ∞ }. For each target T in this set, G(T ) = inf{g(t) | t ∈ T } =
inf{g(t) | t ∈ T }. But each set T only contains a single execution t, so G(T ) = g(t) = g 0 (t) for all
traces. Thus, g and g 0 are the same function, a contradiction.

7

2.1.2

Safety and Liveness
Two subsets of black-and-white properties have been studied extensively: safety and liveness

properties [61, 1]. These sets are fundamentally intertwined with the sets of properties that can be
enforced in practice [101, 64, 37, 2, 38].

2.1.2.1

Safety
Black-and-white safety properties partition “secure” from “insecure” traces in such a way

that every insecure trace has a finite insecure prefix that can never become secure [61].
Definition 5 ([61]). A property p is black-and-white safety iff ∀x ∈ E ∞ : (¬p(x) ⇒ ∃x0  x : ∀y 
x0 : ¬p(y)).
An equivalent, perhaps more intuitive, definition of black-and-white safety is the set of
properties that are both prefix- and omega-closed [37]. Prefix-closed means that all prefixes of
secure traces are secure, while omega-closed means the converse, that if all prefixes of a trace x are
secure then so must be x.
Definition 6 (Equivalent definition of safety [37]). A property p is black-and-white safety iff
∀x ∈ E ∞ : p(x) = (∀x0  x : p(x0 )).
This formalization of black-and-white safety has an interesting similarity to the formalization of black-and-white properties (Definition 3; in both cases, an entity is secure exactly when all
of its “simpler parts” are secure.
It can be seen from these definitions that black-and-white safety properties require traces
to be as secure as their least-secure prefix; security cannot increase as traces proceed. Figure 2.1(a)
plots the general shape of a trace’s security as considered by a black-and-white safety property.
Gray safety properties also require traces to have nonincreasing security, as shown in Figure 2.1(b). However, with gray safety, the requirement that traces be as secure as their least-secure
prefix must be modified—infinite traces may not have a least-secure prefix. To handle such cases
the infimum is again used.
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g(x)

p(x)
true

1

0

false
x=

he1 , e01 i; he2 , e02 i; . . .

x = he1 , e01 i; he2 , e02 i; . . .

(a) Black-and-white Safety

(b) Gray Safety

Figure 2.1. The security of traces as they proceed according to safety properties. The security level
is according to (a) a black-and-white safety property and (b) a gray safety property. The dotted
lines and shaded area represent the possible security values of the executions’ extensions. In all
cases, security levels are nonincreasing.
Definition 7. Formally, property g is gray safety iff ∀x ∈ E ∞ : g(x) = inf{g(x0 ) | x0  x}.
This formalization of gray safety retains the similarity, present in the black-and-white model,
between the definitions of properties and safety.
As an example, the gray property described earlier, specifying that a trace’s security level
gets decimated with each unchecked array access, is a gray safety property. Traces according to this
policy begin as 100% secure (before any exchanges occur) and can only proceed to lower security.
In the limit, a trace containing an infinite number of unchecked array accesses has 0% security,
because the infimum of {1, 0.9, 0.81, 0.729, . . .} is 0.
Because Definitions 5 and 6 are equivalent, and Definition 6 could be “grayified” into
Definition 7, it is tempting to also “grayify” Definition 5 into the following:
∀x ∈ E ∞ : g(x) < 1 ⇒ ∃x0  x : ∀y  x0 : g(y) ≤ g(x).

Unfortunately, this definition is not equivalent to Definition 7 because it excludes gray properties
that should be safety. For example, a gray property that halves the security value of an execution
for every exchange it includes should be gray safety (and is, according to Definition 7). However,
this property maps infinite executions to 0, and all finite prefixes of those infinite executions to
values greater than 0. Since all prefixes have a higher security than their infinite extensions, none
are suitable choices for x0 in the definition above.

9

To fix this problem, the definition could be relaxed so that extensions of x0 need to have a
security value that is no higher than the security value of x0 , rather than the security value of x:
∀x ∈ E ∞ : g(x) < 1 ⇒ ∃x0  x : ∀y  x0 : g(y) ≤ g(x0 ).

This definition is not equivalent to Definition 7 either; it does not require reductions in security to
occur at some finite point. For example, a property could map all finite executions to 1 and all
infinite executions to 0. In the black-and-white world, such termination properties are not safety
properties; it would be incorrect to consider their gray versions to be safety.
Although Definitions 5 and 6 are equivalent, the fact that Definition 6 can be generalized
into the gray model and Definitions 5 cannot suggests that Definition 6 is a better definition of
safety, at least in the sense of being more amenable to generalization.
The following proposition shows that gray safety properties are proper generalizations of
black-and-white safety properties. In other words, if a black-and-white safety property were to
be expressed in the gray world, then it would be a gray safety property, and if a black-and-white
property were to be translated into a gray safety property, then it must have been a black-and-white
safety property.
Proposition 3. Let P be a black-and-white property with predicate p. Define a gray function g as
follows:
g(x) =




1,

if p(x)



0,

if ¬p(x)

Then, g induces a gray safety property iff P is a black-and-white safety property.
Proof. First, it is proved that if P is a black-and-white safety property, then g induces a gray
safety property. For an arbitrary execution x, either p(x) or ¬p(x). In either case, it must be
shown that g(x) = inf{g(x0 ) | x0  x}. If p(x), then by Definition 6, ∀x0  x, p(x0 ). By the
construction of g, ∀x0  x, g(x0 ) = 1 and thus inf{g(x0 ) | x0  x} = 1 = g(x). If ¬p(x), there must
be some x0 : x0  x ∧ ¬p(x0 ). By the construction of g, g will map this prefix to 0, and therefore
inf{g(x0 ) | x0  x} = 0 = g(x) and g induces a gray safety property.
10

g(x)

p(x)
true

1

0

false
x=

he1 , e01 i; he2 , e02 i; . . .

x = he1 , e01 i; he2 , e02 i; . . .

(a) Black-and-white Liveness

(b) Gray Liveness

Figure 2.2. The security of traces as they proceed according to liveness properties. The security
level is according to (a) a black-and-white liveness property and (b) a gray liveness property. The
dotted lines and shaded area represent the possible security values of the executions’ extensions.
In all cases, less-than-fully-secure traces have more-secure extensions.

Conversely, suppose P is a non-safety property. Then there must exist some execution x
such that either p(x) and ∃x0  x : ¬p(x0 ), or ¬p(x) and ∀x0  x : p(x0 ). In the former case,
inf{g(x0 ) | x0  x} = 0 6= g(x), and in the latter inf{g(x0 ) | x0  x} = 1 6= g(x). Thus g does not
induce a gray safety property.

2.1.2.2

Liveness
Black-and-white liveness properties require every finite trace to have a secure extension [1],

as shown in Figure 2.2(a). A canonical example is the termination property, which requires traces
to be finite (so every finite trace x has a secure extension, namely x).
Definition 8 ([1]). A property p is black-and-white liveness iff ∀x ∈ E ∗ : ∃y  x : p(y).
Analogously, gray liveness properties require every finite trace to have a more-secure extension, with traces that are already 100% secure exempted (because a fully secure trace cannot
have a more-secure extension). Figure 2.2(b) illustrates the requirement that, according to a gray
liveness property, every imperfectly secure trace has a more-secure extension.
≥
To formalize gray liveness, a new operator
is defined that behaves exactly like a greater≥
than operator (>), except that 1 1.
Definition 9. A property g is gray liveness iff ∀x ∈ E ∗ : ∃y  x : g(y)

11

≥

g(x).

For example, a gray liveness property could map trace x to a security value based on the
number n of resources acquired but unreleased in x; the security level might be 1−0.01n when
0 ≤ n ≤ 100 and 0 when n > 100. This property gives traces a 1% security penalty for every
unreleased resource. It is a gray liveness property because every finite, imperfectly secure trace has
a more-secure extension (in which acquired resources are released). It is interesting to compare
the usefulness of, and information provided by, this gray property with its black-and-white version,
which simply says that traces are secure iff all acquired resources eventually get released.
As with safety, gray liveness is a proper generalization of black-and-white liveness, as demonstrated by the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Let P be a black-and-white property with predicate p. Construct a gray function
g as follows:
g(x) =




1,

if p(x)



0,

if ¬p(x)

Then, P is a black-and-white liveness property iff g induces a gray liveness property.
Proof. First, it is proved that if P is a black-and-white liveness property, then g induces a gray
liveness property. By the definition of a black-and-white liveness property, ∀x ∈ E ∗ : ∃y  x :
≥
p(y). By the construction of g, g(y) = 1. Therefore, ∀x ∈ E ∗ , ∃y  x : g(y) g(x), because
≥
∀r ∈ R[0,1] , 1 r. Thus, g induces a gray liveness property.
Conversely, suppose that P is not a black-and-white liveness property. By Definition 8,
there exists x ∈ E ∗ : ∀y  x : ¬p(y). Because x  x, ¬p(x). By the construction of g, x and all of
its extensions are mapped to 0. Thus g does not induce a gray liveness property.

2.1.3

Hypersafety and Hyperliveness
Just as black-and-white properties can be categorized as safety or liveness, the same can

be done for black-and-white policies. Using the term “hyperproperty” to mean “policy”, then, hyperproperties can be categorized as hypersafety or hyperliveness [30]. Intuitively, the definitions of
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hypersafety and hyperliveness raise the definitions of safety and liveness from the level of executions
(properties) to the level of sets of executions (policies).
The definitions of safety and liveness rely on the the  and  operators to indicate executions
being prefixed or extended; definitions of hypersafety and hyperliveness will need to raise these
operators to the level of sets of executions. This raising is accomplished by defining a terminating
target system X—that is, a set of finite executions—to prefix another target system Y , written
X v Y , iff every execution in X is a prefix of some execution in Y . Formally, given X ⊆ E ∗ and
Y ⊆ E ∞ , X v Y iff ∀x ∈ X : ∃y ∈ Y : x  y [30, Footnote 13]. The Y w X relation is defined
symmetrically.

2.1.3.1

Hypersafety
Black-and-white hypersafety raises black-and-white safety from the level of traces (execu-

tions) to the level of target systems (sets of executions) by requiring that target systems are secure
iff all their prefixes are secure.
Definition 10 ([30]). A policy P is black-and-white hypersafety iff ∀X ⊆ E ∞ : P (X) = (∀X 0 v
X : P (X 0 )).
Notice the strong similarity between Definitions 10 and 6. Unsurprisingly, the following
definition, which generalizes from gray safety to gray hypersafety, as well as from black-and-white
hypersafety to gray hypersafety, has strong similarility to Definition 7.
Definition 11. A policy G is gray hypersafety iff ∀X ⊆ E ∞ : G(X) = inf{G(X 0 ) | X 0 v X}.
The reasoning that gray hypersafety is a proper generalization of black-and-white hypersafety follows the reasoning used in Proposition 3 to show that gray safety is a proper generalization
of black-and-white safety.
Following [30], it is also possible to define (black-and-white and gray) k-hypersafety by
restricting the set X 0 to have at most k elements.
Definition 12 ([30]). A policy P is black-and-white k-hypersafety iff ∀X ⊆ E ∞ : P (X) = (∀X 0 v
X : P (X 0 ) ∨ |X 0 | > k)}.
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Definition 13. A policy G is gray k-hypersafety iff ∀X ⊆ E ∞ : G(X) = inf{G(X 0 ) | X 0 v
X, |X 0 | ≤ k}.

2.1.3.2

Hyperliveness
Black-and-white hyperliveness requires that all terminating target systems have secure ex-

tensions.
Definition 14 ([30]). A policy P is black-and-white hyperliveness iff ∀X ⊆ E ∗ : ∃Y w X : P (Y )..
Similarly, gray hyperliveness requires that all terminating target systems have more-secure
extensions.
Definition 15. A policy G is gray hyperliveness iff ∀X ⊆ E ∗ : ∃Y w X : G(Y )

≥

G(X).

Gray hyperliveness is a proper generalization of black-and-white hyperliveness by the same
reasoning used in Proposition 4 to show that gray liveness properly generalizes black-and-white
liveness.

2.1.4

Singleton Intersection of Safety and Liveness
In the black-and-white models, exactly one property is both safety and liveness: the “allow-

all” property that considers every trace secure [1]. Similarly, exactly one policy is both hypersafety
and hyperliveness: the policy that considers every target system secure [30]. The following theorems show that, analogously, exactly one property (policy) is both gray (hyper)safety and gray
(hyper)liveness: the property (policy) that considers every trace (target system) perfectly secure.
Theorem 1. The gray property g(x) = 1 is the only gray property that is both gray safety and gray
liveness.
Proof. First note that g(x) = 1 is trivially both a gray safety and a gray liveness property.
Now let g 0 be an arbitrary gray property that is both gray safety and gray liveness. For the
sake of obtaining a contradiction, suppose there exists an execution x such that g 0 (x) < 1. If x is
infinite, it must have a finite prefix whose security is also less than 1 because g 0 is gray safety; let x
14

instead refer to that prefix. Because g 0 is gray liveness, there exists y  x such that g 0 (y)

≥

g 0 (x),

so because g 0 (x) 6= 1, it must be that g 0 (y) > g 0 (x). Also, because g 0 is gray safety, g 0 (y) must
equal inf{g 0 (y 0 ) | y 0  y}. However, x is a prefix of y, so by the definition of infimum, g 0 (y) ≤ g 0 (x),
which contradicts the earlier result that g 0 (y) > g 0 (x). Thus, for all x, g 0 (x) = 1, meaning that g 0
must be g.
Theorem 2. The gray policy G(X) = 1 is the only gray policy that is both gray hypersafety and
gray hyperliveness.
Proof. First note that G(X) = 1 is trivially both a gray hypersafety and a gray hyperliveness
property.
Now let G0 be an arbitrary gray property that is both gray hypersafety and gray hyperliveness. For the sake of obtaining a contradiction, suppose there exists an target system X such that
G0 (X) < 1. Because G0 is gray hypersafety, it must have a terminating target system prefix X 0 such
≥
that G0 (X 0 ) < 1. Because G0 is gray hyperliveness, there exists Y w X 0 such that G0 (Y ) G0 (X 0 ),
so because G0 (X 0 ) 6= 1, it must be that G0 (Y ) > G0 (X 0 ). Also, because G0 is gray hypersafety,
G0 (Y ) must equal inf{G0 (Y 0 ) | Y 0 v Y }. However, X 0 is a prefix of Y 0 , so by the definition of
infimum, G0 (y) ≤ G0 (X 0 ), which contradicts the earlier result that G0 (Y ) > G0 (X 0 ). Thus, for all
X, G0 (X) = 1, meaning that G0 must be G.
Figure 2.3 depicts the relationships between gray properties, black-and-white properties,
and their subsets of safety and liveness properties. Notably, the gray sets subsume the black-andwhite sets, and the intersection of safety and liveness is the black-and-white allow-all property.

2.1.5

Decomposition into Safety and Liveness
In the black-and-white models, every property p can be decomposed into properties ps and

pl such that:
1. ps is a black-and-white safety property,
2. pl is a black-and-white liveness property, and
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Figure 2.3. Relationships between gray and black-and-white properties. Also depicted are their
subsets of safety and liveness properties. The central dot represents the intersection of safety and
liveness, which only contains the property g(x) = 1.

3. p(x) = (ps (x) ∧ pl (x)).
In other words, every black-and-white property is the conjunction of a single safety and a single
liveness property. This result appeared in [1], with alternative proofs appearing in [100, 64]. A
similar result has been shown for decomposing policies into hypersafety and hyperliveness [30].
Theorem 3 shows that the gray model preserves this decomposition result.
Theorem 3. Every gray property g can be decomposed into gs and g` such that:
1. gs is a gray safety property,
2. g` is a gray liveness property, and
3. g(x) = min(gs (x), g` (x)).
Proof. Construct gs and g` as follows, where sup refers to the supremum function.





inf{gs (x0 ) | x0  x}
if x ∈ E ω






gs (x) =
g(x)
if x ∈ E ∗ and ∀x0  x : g(x0 ) ≤ g(x)









 sup{g(x0 ) | x0  x}
otherwise

g` (x) =






 1

if x ∈ E ∗ and ∀x0  x : g(x0 ) ≤ g(x)





 g(x)

otherwise

16

To establish that gs is gray safety, it must be shown that for all x ∈ E ∞ , gs (x) = inf{gs (x0 ) |
x0  x}. By construction, this constraint holds for all x ∈ E ω . For finite executions, gs ensures
that security never increases as traces proceed by giving every finite trace x a security value that’s
greater than or equal to all of x’s extensions. Hence, the safety constraint holds for all finite
executions as well.
To establish that g` is gray liveness, it must be shown that for all x ∈ E ∗ , ∃y  x :
g` (y)

≥

g` (x). Let x be a finite execution. If all extensions x0 of x have security less than or equal

to x (according to g), then g` (x) = 1 and the liveness constraint is satisfied by letting y = x. On the
other hand, if some extension x0 of x has security greater than x (according to g), then g` (x) = g(x)
and the liveness constraint is satisfied by letting y = x0 (where g` (x0 ) must be at least g(x0 ), which
is greater than g(x) = g` (x)).
It remains to establish that g(x) = min(gs (x), g` (x)). If x is a finite trace then this result
immediately follows from the definitions of gs and g` . If x is an infinite trace, first observe that gs
assigns every prefix x0 of x a security level of at least g(x). Hence, gs assigns x ∈ E ω a security
level of at least g(x), while g` assigns x ∈ E ω a security level of g(x), which completes the proof.

As in the black-and-white models, the decomposition result in the gray model extends to
policies, hypersafety, and hyperliveness.
Theorem 4. Every gray policy G can be decomposed into Gs and G` such that:
1. Gs is a gray hypersafety policy,
2. G` is a gray hyperliveness policy, and
3. G(X) = min(Gs (X), G` (X)).
Proof. Construct Gs and G` as follows, where sup refers to the supremum function.
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Gs (X) =

G` (X) =






G(X)







if X v X and ∀X 0  X : G(X 0 ) ≤ G(X)

sup{G(X 0 ) | X 0 v X}









 inf{Gs (X 0 ) | X 0 v X}

if X v X and ∃X 0  X : G(X 0 ) > G(X)
otherwise






 1

if X v X and ∀X 0 v X : G(X 0 ) ≤ G(X)





 G(X)

otherwise

To establish that Gs is gray hypersafety, it must be shown that for all X ⊆ E ∞ , Gs (X) =
inf{Gs (X 0 ) | X 0 v x}. By construction, this constraint holds for all X such that X 6v X (i.e., when
X is not a terminating target system). For terminating target systems, Gs ensures that security
never increases as target systems extend by giving every terminating target system X a security
value that’s greater than or equal to all of X’s extensions. Hence, the hypersafety constraint holds
for all terminating target systems as well.
To establish that G` is gray liveness, it must be shown that for all X ⊆ E ∗ , ∃Y w X :
≥
G` (Y ) Gl (X). Let X be a terminating target system. If all extensions X 0 of X have security
less than or equal to X (according to G), then G` (X) = 1 and the liveness constraint is satisfied
by letting Y = X. On the other hand, if some extension X 0 of X has security greater than X
(according to G), then G` (X) = G(X) and the liveness constraint is satisfied by letting Y = X 0
(where G` (X 0 ) must be at least G(X 0 ), which is greater than G(X) = G` (X)).
It remains to establish that G(X) = min(Gs (X), G` (X)). If X is a terminating target
system then this result immediately follows from the definitions of Gs and G` . Otherwise, first
observe that Gs assigns every prefix X 0 of X a security level of at least G(X). Hence, Gs assigns
X a security level of at least G(x), while G` assigns X a security level of G(X), which completes
the proof.
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Table 2.1. Summary of the generalization from black-and-white to gray policies. The black-and≥
white definitions are taken from [101, 1, 37, 30]. As a reminder, the
operator behaves like
≥
greater-than (>), except that 1 1.
∞

policy

property

safety

liveness

hypersafety

hyperliveness

2.1.6

P : 2E → {f alse, true}
∞

G : 2E → R[0,1]
∃p : ∀X ⊆ E ∞ : P (X) = (∀x ∈ X : p (x))
∃g : ∀X ⊆ E ∞ : G (X) = inf{g (x) | x ∈ X}
∀x ∈ E ∞ : p(x) = (∀x0  x : p(x0 ))
∀x ∈ E ∞ : g(x) = inf{g(x0 ) | x0  x}
∀x ∈ E ∗ : ∃y  x : p(y)
∀x ∈ E ∗ : ∃y  x : g(y)

≥

g(x)

∀X ⊆ E ∞ : P (X) = (∀X 0 v X : P (X 0 ))
∀X ⊆ E ∞ : G(X) = inf{G(X 0 ) | X 0 v X}
∀X ⊆ E ∗ : ∃Y w X : P (Y )
∀X ⊆ E ∗ : ∃Y w X : G(Y )

≥

G(X)

Summary
Table 2.1 summarizes the gray definitions and compares each with its black-and-white coun-

terpart.

2.2

Silhouettes and Their Judges
The gray model separates specifications of how secure target systems are (gray policies) from

specifications of how secure users require their systems to be (silhouette judges). In the safe analogy
of Chapter 1, silhouette judges input a safe’s security rating and output a buy or don’t-buy decision.
In other words, silhouette judges input a silhouette—a distillation of a safe’s characteristics into
a security value—and output a no/yes decision to indicate whether that silhouette is acceptably
secure.
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2.2.1

Silhouettes
Thus, silhouette judges, as their name implies, judge silhouettes, by outputting a no/yes

(or false/true) to indicate whether a given silhouette is acceptably secure.
In the gray model, a silhouette represents the shape of a trace’s (or target system’s) security.
For example, the plots shown in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 illustrate silhouettes of traces—the plots
abstract from the events of the underlying traces to provide only the shape of the security values
achieved as the traces proceed.
Silhouettes can be formalized in many ways. For generality, the key requirement is to encode
a trace’s (or target system’s) evolution of security values.
For example, the silhouette of a trace x according to property g can be formalized as a
function s that takes a natural number n, or a special ∞ symbol, as input and returns the security
(according to g) of x’s n-length prefix, or the security of x itself if s’s input is ∞. With this
formalization, silhouettes are partial functions; e.g., the silhouette of the empty trace is undefined
for all inputs n > 0.
With this formalization, the silhouette of trace x according to gray property g is the partial
function sx,g : (N ∪ {∞}) → R[0,1] , such that:

sx,g (n) =




g(x)

if n = ∞



g(x0 )

if x0 is the n-length prefix of x

Because target systems may be infinite sets of infinite-length traces, silhouettes of target
systems are more complicated than those of individual traces. Rather than mapping natural numbers to security values, target-system silhouettes could map real numbers to security values. In this
case, the real number can encode which parts of the target system’s traces to evaluate the security
of.
For example,

a silhouette for target system X could interpret an input like

0.192939..969109119... as identifying the set of traces containing the 1-length prefix of X’s first
execution (ordered lexicographically), the 2-length prefix of X’s second execution, and so on, with
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each prefix length delimited by a 9 and written in base-7. Under this encoding, the target-system
silhouette could interpret a 7 (8) appearing before the ith 9 in an input real number as indicating
exclusion of the (inclusion of the whole) ith execution in X.
With such a formalization, the silhouette of target system X according to gray policy G is
the partial function SX,G : R → R[0,1] , such that:
SX,G (r) = G(X 0 ), where r encodes X 0 with respect to X

2.2.2

Silhouette Judges
Silhouette judges are simply predicates over silhouettes. A judge therefore acts as the final,

black-and-white decision maker, determining whether a trace or target system is acceptably secure.
Importantly, judges base their decisions on silhouettes of traces or target systems, not on the traces
or target systems themselves, as is done in black-and-white models.
For example, a silhouette judge could forbid all trace silhouettes whose security ever drops
below a certain minimum threshold. This sort of silhouette judge specifies a user’s minimum
security requirement, such as “traces must always be at least 80% secure”.
Another silhouette judge might forbid all silhouettes whose “final” security value (obtained
by inputting ∞ or 0.8989898... to the given silhouette) is greater than 0. Such a judge might be
used by high-performance systems researchers to require the complete insecurity of their executions.
More interesting judges can also be defined. For example, it may be reasonable to allow
executions to occasionally behave less securely, provided they are usually more secure. Such a
judge might be satisfied by exactly those silhouettes having a rolling average of security above a
given threshold. Other judges could be satisfied by exactly those silhouettes that never dip below
a desired threshold for more than k consecutive exchanges.
Theorem 5 states that combining a gray property g with a trace-silhouette judge j produces
a unique black-and-white property p, but, on the other hand, every black-and-white property can
be decomposed into uncountably many different gray-property, trace-silhouette-judge pairs. Theo-
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rem 6 states a similar result for black-and-white policies and gray-policy, trace-system-silhouettejudge pairs.
Theorem 5. There is a one-to-uncountably-many correspondence between black-and-white properties p and pairs of gray properties and trace-silhouette judges (g, j) such that ∀x ∈ E ∞ : p(x) ⇔
j(sx,g ).
Proof. Every gray-property, trace-silhouette-judge pair (g, j) is equivalent to exactly one blackand-white property p; otherwise, there must be some execution x whose silhouette according to g,
sx,g , both satisfies and dissatisfies j, a contradiction.
It remains to show that every black-and-white property can be expressed by an uncountable
number of gray-property, silhouette-judge pairs. Given black-and-white property p and arbitrary
r ∈ R[0,1] , construct a gray property gr and silhouette judge jr as follows:

gr (x) =




r

if p(x)



0

otherwise

jr (s) ⇔ (s(∞) = r)
By construction, p(x) ⇔ jr (sx,gr ). Because there are uncountably many values of r, there
are uncountably many pairs of (gr , jr ) equivalent to p.

Theorem 6. There is a one-to-uncountably-many correspondence between black-and-white policies P and pairs of gray policies and target-system-silhouette judges (G, J) such that ∀X ⊆ E ∞ :
P (X) ⇔ J(SX,G ).
Proof. Every gray-policy, target-system-silhouette-judge pair (G, J) is equivalent to exactly one
black-and-white policy P ; otherwise, there must be some target system X whose silhouette according to G, SX,G , both satisfies and dissatisfies J, a contradiction.
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It remains to show that every black-and-white policy can be expressed by an uncountable
number of gray-policy, silhouette-judge pairs. Given black-and-white policy P and arbitrary r ∈
R[0,1] , construct a gray policy Gr and silhouette judge Jr as follows:

Gr (X) =




r

if P (X)



0

otherwise

Jr (S) ⇔ (S(0.898989...) = r)
By construction, P (x) ⇔ Jr (SX,Gr ). Because there are uncountably many values of r, there
are uncountably many pairs of (Gr , Jr ) equivalent to P .
These theorems demonstrate the increased expressiveness of gray policies, properties, and
silhouette judges, compared to black-and-white policies and properties.
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CHAPTER 3
DEFINING GRAY POLICIES

This chapter1 presents several examples of gray policies to demonstrate how gray policies
can be constructed in practice. At a high-level, two methods of constructing gray policies are
explored:
1. leveraging existing works on security metrics, which seek to quantify the security of programs
and/or executions (Section 3.1).
2. converting black-and-white security policies into usefully quantified gray policies (Section 3.2).
While gray policies can certainly be built in many other ways, these two approaches leverage
existing research to construct interesting and useful policies.

3.1

Gray Policies from Security Metrics
Security metrics, which seek to quantify various aspects of security, are a natural source to

rely on when constructing gray policies. In addition, security metrics in general benefit from the
gray model, as the gray model serves as a unifying framework for disparate approaches to security
metrics. The disparate approaches include:
1. using greater values to indicate higher levels of security (e.g., [36]),
2. using greater values to indicate lower levels of security (e.g., [73]),
3. limiting security values to a bounded range (e.g., [25]),
4. limiting security values to a range bounded only on the lower side (e.g., [63]), and
1

Portions of this chapter were previously published in [96]. Permission to use this material is in Appendix A.
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Table 3.1. Examples of functions that can normalize security metrics to the range of R[0,1] . Variable
x denotes the output of the security metric, constants A and B denote the metric’s minimum and
maximum values (when applicable), and constant C denotes a positive number (C affects how
quickly the functions converge to absolute security or insecurity).
bounded

lower bounded

higher values
represent
higher security

y=

x−A
B−A

y=

x−A
x−A+C

higher values
represent
lower security

y=

B−x
B−A

y=

C
x−A+C

unbounded
y = 0.5 +

y = 0.5 +

tan−1 (C ∗ x)
π

tan−1 (−C ∗ x)
π

5. placing no bounds on the range of security values (e.g., [9]).
In contrast to black and white models, all of these approaches can be encoded in the gray model.
Encoding these disparate approaches to security metrics in the gray model provides the
benefit of consistency. In the gray model, security consistently ranges between 0 and 1, and for a
fixed policy or property, greater security values consistently indicate higher security.
Table 3.1 shows several example functions that can be used to encode security metrics
as gray policies. The arctangent functions shown in this table can be used to normalize metrics
having an unbounded range because the arctangent’s domain is all real numbers, and its output
monotonically increases over the range (− π2 , π2 ). The arccotangent function (cot−1 ), and many
others, could be used instead.
Using the functions presented in Table 3.1, security metrics from domains as varied as access
control, noninterference, privacy, integrity, and network security can be encoded as a gray policy
or property; the remainder of this section gives examples from each of these categories.

3.1.1

Access Control
Access control policies focus on ensuring that resources are only granted to authorized users.

Typical black-and-white access control policies include access control lists [98], role-based access
control [42], multi-level systems (e.g., the Bell-Lapudala [13] model), and the Chinese Wall [19].
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Access control gray policies can be created by leveraging existing work on quantifying
access control. For example, multi-level systems have been considered that view access rights as a
quantitative attribute [26, 25]. To demonstrate, a user could be granted 80% of the right to access
secret information; this represents a 20% risk that the user will disclose the secret information to
an unauthorized entity. A gray function could be constructed for this kind of model by calculating
the cumulative risk of an unauthorized disclosure as an execution proceeds and access to secret
information is granted.
g(x) =

Y

Risk(he, e0 i)

he,e0 i∈x

This gray policy is gray safety; as risk values are probabilities between 0 and 1, the overall
risk of an execution can only decrease as it proceeds.
A similar construction of a gray policy can be used to express more recent work which
models a distributed system with a central policy oracle being enforced locally by several policy
enforcers [80]. Over time, the policy enforcers learn to predict how the oracle will respond to
requests. If a policy enforcer is confident enough in its prediction, it can choose to not consult with
the oracle. However, the predictions are uncertain, so the local enforcer might forbid a valid request,
or grant an invalid one. The risk introduced by each local decision can be calculated by taking into
account the utility of the request, and the potential damage of a false characterizations [80].
Other approaches to quantifying access control include measuring, for a specific resource, the
“strength” of a user’s (black-and-white) authorization (quantified by counting how many ways the
user could prove authorization), or how close a user is to being authorized (quantified by counting
how many credentials the user lacks) [62]. These metrics could be used to construct a gray function
that maps executions to their “worst” resource grant, where grants for stronger authorizations are
considered more secure while grants for more distant inauthorizations are considered less secure; if
the execution has no worst resource grant, the greatest lower bound could be used.
To construct this gray policy, denote as ∆Cred the distance by which a user’s credentials
either surpass or fail to reach the required authorization; ∆Cred is 0 when the user exactly meets the
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requirements, positive when the user has more than enough credentials, and otherwise is negative.
tan−1 (∆Cred(he, e0 i))
g(x) = inf 0.5 +
| he, e0 i ∈ x
π




This construction examines each exchange in an execution in isolation, and determines the
relative strength (or weakness) of the credentials involved in the exchange, relative to the required
authorization. As expected, an execution’s security will be mapped to its weakest authorization, or
to the greatest upper bound if the execution does not have a weakest authorization. By construction,
this gray property is gray safety; executions which include weak resource grants cannot be made
more secure.
Still other access control systems involve users earning “reputation”, a quantitative score
that can be used to determine which authorizations a user should be granted [9, 8, 114, 111,
112]. For example, a website might require a user to have at least 10 video reputation, or 50
comment reputation, before allowing the user to flag a video as inappropriate. More generally,
reputation policies are boolean combinations of (Category, Threshold) pairs (e.g., OR((Video,
10), (Comment, 50))). The degree to which a user U satisfies a specific threshold T in category
Cat could be quantified as follows:

d(U, (Cat, T )) = 0.5 +

tan−1 (U.Cat − T )
π

With this construction, a user that is just barely meets the threshold has a degree of
0.5; users with higher reputations get mapped asymptotically closer to 1, while users with lower
reputations get mapped asymptotically closer to 0. Then, the degree to which a request satisfies a
reputation policy could be computed by replacing all OR functions with max and all AND functions
with min. Gray properties could then grade executions based on the degree to which individual
reputation policies are satisfied.
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3.1.2

Noninterference
Noninterference policies place restrictions on how trusted (secret) inputs to an application

(e.g., insider trading information) can influence its untrusted (public) outputs (e.g., buy/sell operations). When noninterference policies are satisfied, it should be impossible for an attacker to learn
anything about an application’s trusted inputs by only observing its untrusted outputs [16, 47, 76].
In some applications, noninterference can be too strict of a requirement; the classic example
is of a password checker, which leaks knowledge about the (trusted-input) password database when
a wrong password is given (namely, that the actual password is not the given password) [29]. Thus,
a (black-and-white) noninterference policy must forbid the password-checker from running.
As such, work has been done to relax noninterference by allowing an application to leak
some knowledge of the trusted inputs [24, 104, 17, 29, 6, 4, 81, 41, 3, 82, 74]. Classically, leaked
knowledge is measured in bits, where each bit effectively doubles an attacker’s chance of correctly
guessing the trusted inputs, although more recent work has measured leakage as an arbitrary “gain”
of the attacker [4, 74]. Several methods for computing the leakage of a program have been presented,
such as:
1. Calculating the ratio of an attacker’s a priori and a posteriori uncertainty [104, 17, 6, 4,
3, 82]. In this context, uncertainty can be quantified using information-theoretic entropy
(e.g., Shannon entropy, Rényi entropy). Before the execution begins, an attacker has some
assumption of what the trusted input could be. For example, if the trusted input is an
encryption key, the attacker could assume that all 128-bit values are equally probable; if the
trusted input is a password, the attacker might consider some passwords as more likely than
others. As an execution progresses, the initial assumption becomes more and more refined
as parts of the trusted input are eliminated or confirmed. An equivalent metric that takes
the difference of the a priori and a posteriori uncertainty has also been investigated [17].
2. Calculating the difference between an attacker’s a priori and a posteri accuracy [29]. Here,
accuracy is the distance between the actual trusted input distribution and what the attacker
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believes to be the trusted input distribution, quantified as the relative entropy between the
two.
Regardless of which information leakage method is used, the number of bits leaked by an
execution (or the gain of an adversary) could be used as the basis for a gray function. Let L be a
method for computing the leakage of an execution and define gray function g as follows:

g(x) = 0.5 +

tan−1 (−L(x))
π

When L is based on an uncertainty metric and the attacker has perfect knowledge of the
program’s behavior, the attacker’s uncertainty can only decrease (i.e., the information leakage can
only increase) as a program executes [82]. In this special case, g induces a gray safety property; no
extension of an execution can make the attacker more uncertain.
However, when L is based on accuracy, or if the attacker does not have perfect knowledge
of the program’s behavior, it is possible for an execution to have negative information flow [82, 29].
In such cases, an extension can be more secure than the execution it extends, and therefore g does
not induce a gray safety property.
Other notions of black-and-white noninterference compare different executions of a target
system that differ in their trusted inputs and require that untrusted outputs be unaffected by
these changes in trusted inputs. Such notions place noninterference firmly outside of the realm
of properties, because the overall security of a target system depends on relationships between
different executions, rather than solely the executions themselves. For example, a target system
might be permitted to contain a certain trace if it does not contain another particular trace.
Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a security metric that quantifies the degree to
which target systems satisfy such notions of noninterference. If such a metric existed, it would
serve as an example of how to construct a gray non-property policy.
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3.1.3

Integrity
Dual to information leakage is information integrity, which forbids untrusted inputs from

affecting trusted outputs. When properly enforced, an attacker should be incapable of influencing
the trusted outputs of an application. A classic example of an integrity policy is Biba’s integrity
model [14], in which trusted subjects cannot read untrusted data, and untrusted subjects cannot
write to trusted data.
Just as noninterference prevents a password-checking program, strict models of integrity
may also forbid otherwise reasonable programs. For example, if the password database of an
operating system is considered trusted, the Biba integrity policy would forbid an untrusted user
from changing his or her password. Thus, it may be desirable to relax integrity policies and allow
some amount of integrity loss to occur.
Relatively little work has been done on quantifying integrity loss. Clarkson and Schneider [31] quantify the damage to integrity as “corruption”, measured in bits. Corruption can come
from either the contamination of trusted outputs by untrusted inputs, or the suppression of trusted
inputs before they are output. For example, if the trusted output is the result of a bitwise OR of a
trusted input and a random, untrusted input then contamination has occurred, whereas outputting
a truncated version of an input is suppression.
Let Corruption(x) denote the corruption exhibited by an execution x (measured in bits),
and let |T Out(x)| denote the number of bits in x’s trusted outputs. A gray function that maps
executions to their percent integrity could be defined as follows.

g(x) =




inf{g(y)|y  x}

if |T Out(x)| is infinite



 Corruption(x)

otherwise

|T Out(x)|

This gray function induces a gray liveness property because any finite execution can be
made more secure by outputting trusted inputs.
Like noninterference, integrity is often viewed as a non-property policy, but no quantified
security metrics have been formalized to measure this kind of idea.
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3.1.4

Privacy and Anonymity
The advent of big data and the growing use of technology in historically repressive areas has

renewed interest in privacy, where entities choose which information about themselves are available
to others. Security policies that enforce privacy limit or prevent the unauthorized or unintentional
disclosure of user information.
Some privacy policies are enforced by the users of a service. For example, suppose a user
wishes to use a search engine, but does not want the search engine to learn about his or her interests.
The search engine, on the other hand, wishes to build a profile of the user’s interests for its own
use, or to be sold at a later time. Several tools have been proposed e.g., [58, 27]) that add “chaff”
to users’ interactions with the search engine; the search engine, unable to distinguish between the
actual query and the chaff, has a more difficult time constructing user profiles. The methods used
to quantify the privacy provided by such tools (e.g., [46, 92]) could be used to construct privacy
gray functions.
Other privacy policies are enforced by the service being used. For example, an organization
might monitor its employees and calculate the probability that an employee is violating the (blackand-white) privacy policy of the organization [5]. To calculate this probability, a dynamic Bayesian
network could be constructed that models the normal, policy-obeying behavior of the employee.
The Bayesian network encodes relationships such as “if the employee spends more than 5 minutes
on a case, it is more likely that the privacy policy is being violated” or “if the behavior of the
employee was normal yesterday, it is more likely that the employee will behave normal today”. A
gray function could be constructed that simulates a dynamic Bayesian network for each employee
in the given execution and returns the total chance that all employees are following the privacy
policy.

g(x) =

Y

(probability that emp ’s actions in x follow the privacy policy)

emp∈Employees

An interesting subset of privacy policies enforce anonymity to attempt to prevent outside
observers from knowing which users are performing various actions. Classic examples of mechanisms
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that enforce anonymity are the Dining Cryptographers [23] and Crowds [97] protocols. Several
methods have been proposed for evaluating and quantifying the anonymity provided by protocols
such as these; the remainder of this subsection provides examples of how such metrics could be
used to create gray anonymity policies.
Simple metrics for measuring anonymity include counting the number of users of the protocol [23], or calculating the maximum chance that an attacker can link a user with a message created
by the user [54]. However, these metrics do not provide many guarantees [36]. For example, the
second of these does not differentiate between when one user is most likely the creator amongst a
large number of users, and when one user is equally likely amongst a small number of users; it can
be argued that the latter is a more secure situation.
More advanced metrics can be constructed using information-theoretic entropy [36, 103, 33,
22, 32, 49]. At a high level, these approaches assume that, after observing a trace of messages, the
attacker has some probability distribution of which message belongs to which person. In the worst
case, the attacker knows with absolute certainly who sent each message, and the entropy of the
probability distribution is 0. In the best case, each message could be attributed to each user with
equal probability, and the entropy of the probability distribution is maximized.
Let H(AP D|x) be the entropy of the attacker’s probability distribution after observing an
execution x, and H(U P D|x) be the best-case entropy for execution x. Then, a gray function can
be constructed as follows.
g(x) =

H(AP D|x)
H(U P D|x)

Another measure of anonymity provided by a protocol comes from counting how many
perfect matchings there are in a bipartite graph where one partition represents input messages and
the other output messages [40]. This approach assumes that an observer can use timing information
to eliminate possible input/output message combinations. For example, if a protocol ensures that
a message will get sent within some time limit t, then an output message could only have come
from messages input in the last t units of time.
In a bipartite graph, the number of perfect matchings can be calculated by taking the
permanent of its adjacency matrix. In the best case where every output message could be any
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input message, the number of perfect matchings is n!, where n is the number of messages. In the
worst case, there is only 1 perfect matching.
Assume that M (x) returns the set of (input and output) messages in an execution x; if
there are more input messages than output messages, M (x) adds “dummy” output messages that
occur at the same time as the last message in x. Then, if per calculates the permanent of the
adjacency matrix imposed by a set of messages, Formula 2 of [40] can be used to help define a gray
function:

g(x) =





1







0

if |M (x)| = 0
if |M (x)| = 2




inf({gAnon (y)|y  x})






(x)))

 log(per(M
|M (x)|
log(

2

!)

if M (x) is infinite
otherwise

Note that the final case of this construction will always result in a number between 0 and
1; it is computing the ratio between the number of perfect matchings in the message matrix and
the maximum possible number of perfect matchings for a matrix of that size. Thus, the closer a
matrix is to having as many perfect matchings as possible, the higher its security will be.

3.1.5

Network Security
Network security policies are meant to ensure the overall security of a network system.

Typical black-and-white policies include firewall policies, routing policies, etc. that try to ensure
that the network is only used for valid traffic. A large variety of network security metrics have
been proposed; this subsection explores how some of these metrics can be used to construct gray
policies.
One high-level approach could be to repeatedly simulate a network against a random source
of attacks [21, 116]. The ratio of successful attacks to the number of simulations is a natural gray
policy, and can be directly computed using existing techniques.
In another work, a network is represented as a state machine, where each state is a network
configuration and edges represent different exploits available to attacks, weighted by how challenging

33

it is to use or create the exploit [91]. Some configurations are marked as “critical”, and an attack
succeeds when it places the network in a critical state.
To judge the overall security of the network, the state machine is analyzed to find the smallest set of exploits (by weight) that can move the network from its current state to a critical state.
This set represents the so-called “weakest adversary” that can penetrate the network. Consider a
function W A that, when given an execution, computes the cumulative weight of the weakest adversary for the state machine, assuming that the initial state is the one reached by simulating the
network’s state machine on the given execution as input. A gray function can then be constructed
from W A:

g(x) =

W A(x)
1 + W A(x)

This gray property is neither safety nor liveness; it is possible that a fully-compromised
network cannot be made safe again, but partially compromised networks might be made more
secure by undoing the exploits performed by the adversary.
Alternatively, a gray security function could be constructed to calculate the chance that
an attack is occurring. One approach is to construct an attack graph from the network graph.
In the attack graph, network vulnerabilities are vertexes and edges represent preconditions [44].
Each vertex is annotated with a chance of success using existing vulnerability databases, and
some vertices are marked as critical. The chance that an attack occurs can then be calculated
directly by finding the most likely path from the attack graph’s initial states (i.e., the vertices that
have no preconditions) to a critical state. In this model, a gray function can be constructed in a
manner similar to the previous construction by recomputing this chance of attack success under
the assumption that the initial states are those reached by an already-executed prefix x from the
original input states.
AssetRank [99], another attack-graph approach, instead analyzes attack graphs using a
modified version of the PageRank algorithm [90] to identify which vulnerabilities contribute most
to a system’s insecurity. Using AssetRank, a gray policy can be constructed that maps systems
with particularly insecure components to lower and lower values as follows.
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G(X) =

mean asset rank of X’s attack graph
maximum asset rank of X’s attack graph

Other network security policies instead compute the chance that some goal will be satisfied.
For example, one approach constructs a “goal graph” where vertices are either goals (e.g., database
contents are confidential), events (e.g., an attacker finds a SQL-injection vulnerability), or treatments (e.g., replacing all database accesses with parameterized queries) [7]. In this graph, vertices
are labeled with a chance of success and a chance of failure, and edges between vertices describe
relationships such as “replacing all database accesses with parameterized queries make it less likely
for an attacker to find a SQL injection vulnerability” and “an attacker finding a SQL-injection
vulnerability makes it more likely that database contents will not be confidential”.
Analysis of the resulting graph can derive the overall chance that a particular goal is satisfied. Other approaches use simpler tree structures to calculate this probability [10, 28]. Regardless
of how the probability is computed, it can be used as the basis of a gray policy without modification.
Yet another network-security metric arises from intrusion-detection mechanisms, which observe network traffic to detect ongoing attacks. Typically, an intrusion-detection mechanism computes the probability that an attack is occurring, and raises an alert when this probability raises
above some threshold. While there is some inherent uncertainty associated with these probabilities [88], they could nonetheless be used to construct useful gray policies.
For example, one intrusion-detection mechanism augments a network with a number of
agents that monitor traffic [50]. Each agent has an internal Bayesian network that calculates the
chance that a specific attack is occurring (e.g., one agent might be configured to detect denial-ofservice attacks, while another might be configured to detect IP spoofing, etc.). As the network is
used, these agents report to a centralized agent that has its own Bayesian network for computing
the overall chance that an attack is occurring. A gray function could be constructed by simulating
the given execution in this agent-based model and returning the output of the centralized agent.
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3.1.5.1

Mean Time to Security Failure
In reliability theory, mean time to failure is a common measure of how reliable a system

is that represents the average length of time between system failures. This concept was extended
by quantified security researchers into mean time to security failure, which represents the average
amount of time required of an attacker to cause a security failure [66]. Several methods to calculate
this value for a program have been proposed, including:
1. Constructing an attack graph that shows that states involved in a successful attack (e.g.
reconnaissance, penetration, escalation), and computing or estimating the amount of effort
required to transition from each state to the next. This graph can then by analyzed as a
Markov chain, and the mean time to security failure computer [63, 77].
2. Constructing a graph where nodes represent system states. The effort required to transition
the system from one state to another is computed, and the states are classified as either
secure, vulnerable, or compromised. This graph is then analyzed as a Markov chain, and
the average effort taken to get the system into a compromised state is computed [69, 68, 51].
3. Constructing a graph where nodes represent a set of user privileges. An edge from one
node to another represents the capability of the first user to assume the privileges of the
second user, either legitimately, from guessing the second user’s password, or from using
some exploit. Each of these edges is weighted based on the difficulty of the transition, and
then the graph is analyzed as a Markov chain, and the average effort required to go from
normal privileges to root privileges is calculated [34, 87].
4. Constructing a formula that attempts to calculate mean-time-to-security failure directly [78].
This formula has several parameters, including the time an exploit takes to run, the chance
an existing exploit can succeed, the time required to construct a new exploit, the chance
that a newly-constructed exploit will fail, and the time that it takes to find new vulnerabilities to exploit. Some of these parameters, such as the time it takes to construct a new
exploit, are dependent on the skill of the proposed attacker, whereas others, such as the
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chance that a constructed exploit will fail, are dependent on the security of the system being
attacked.
Regardless of how the mean time to security failure is computed, translating the resulting
number to a gray policy is straightforward. Consider the following policy, where M T T SF is the
mean time to security failure measured in hours:

G(X) =

M T T SF (X)
1 + M T T SF (X)

Based on this policy, programs that take no effort to breach are completely insecure, while
programs that have a higher mean time to security failure will be mapped to values closer and closer
to 1. Note that there is an implicit assumption in this model that the mean time to software failure
is finite; that is, a breach will happen with enough effort, and as such no program is completely
secure (i.e. mapped to the value 1).

3.1.5.2

Attackable Surface Area
Another common network security metric is attack surface area [57, 56, 107, 73, 72, 45],

which is based on the principle that an attacker can only breach the security of a system if he or
she can interact with it. Furthermore, the capabilities of the attacker are limited by the capabilities
of the part of the system that he or she is interacting with.
The various attack surface area metrics quantify the security of a system by measuring the
number of ways an attacker can interact with the system, while weighting each of these interactions
by the damage they are capable of causing. Regardless of exactly how the attack surface area is
calculated, the existing metrics can be expressed as gray policies in the following manner:

G(X) =

1
1 + attack surface area of X

According to this policy, any program that does not accept any input is considered perfectly
secure, and programs with higher attack surface area are mapped to lower and lower values.
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Alternatively, a gray function could be constructed based on an attack surface area metric
for individual executions. For example, a gray function could lower the security of an execution
once it opens a socket, only to be (fully or partially) restored when the socket is closed.

3.2

Graying Black-and-white Policies
Gray policies can also be created from existing black-and-white policies. For example,

a gray policy G(X) could be created by quantifying how well the given target system X obeys
a particular black-and-white policy. This technique has already been used in this dissertation’s
examples: black-and-white policies might require all array accesses to be checked or all acquired
resources to be released; these policies were grayed by penalizing target systems based on how far
their traces deviate from ideal traces. A similar idea is used with cost-aware enforcement [38],
where a cost, or penalty, can be assigned to certain exchanges.
Another approach to graying considers the overall security achieved by permitting some
“insecure” executions to be run and/or denying some “secure” executions from being run [39].
Gray policies could be defined based on a similar idea: Given a black-and-white property
of interest p, G(X) might be defined as the product of:
• the probability that a randomly selected element of X satisfies p—such a probability measures the soundness of X with respect to p—and
• the probability that a randomly selected element of {x | p(x)} is in X—such a probability
measures the completeness of X with respect to p.
Following [71], these probabilities could be weighted by the likelihood of traces to actually be
observed (due to nonuniform input distributions and target-system functionality, some traces may
be observed much more frequently than others). Therefore, when calculating G(X) in terms of the
soundness and completeness probabilities defined above, one might choose traces not from uniform
distributions, but instead with the more-likely-to-be-observed traces more likely to be chosen.
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CHAPTER 4
PREVENTING INJECTION ATTACKS

According to multiple sources, the most commonly reported software attacks are injection
attacks, including SQL injections, cross-site scripting, and OS-command injections [79, 85, 89]. To
demonstrate the value of the gray model, this chapter1 explores how gray policies and silhouette
judges can be formed to mitigate code-injection attacks.

4.1

Examples of Injection Attacks
Applications vulnerable to injection attacks generate output programs based on untrusted

inputs. By providing a malicious input, an attacker can cause the application to output a malicious
program. A classic example involves a simple web application for a bank; the application inputs a
password and returns the balance of accounts with the given password. On a typical, benign input
such as 123456, the banking application outputs the following program (throughout this chapter,
input symbols injected into the output program are underlined).
SELECT balance FROM accts WHERE pw=‘123456’
Unfortunately, if this application does not validate its input, it can be manipulated into
creating malicious programs, such as the following.
SELECT balance FROM accts WHERE pw=‘’ OR 1=1 --’
This output program circumvents the password check and returns the balances of all accounts because (1) the 1=1 subexpression is a tautology, making the entire WHERE clause true, and
(2) in SQL, the -- sequence begins a comment, which removes the final apostrophe and makes
1
Many of the ideas and much of the text in this chapter were previously published in [94, 95]. Permission to use
this material is in Appendix A.
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the program syntactically valid. Because some of the injected symbols are code symbols (i.e.,
disjunction and equality operators), this is an example of a code-injection attack.
Due to their prevalence, much research has been performed to define code-injection attacks
formally (e.g., [94, 108, 15, 52, 83, 113]). Many additional papers have described tools for detecting
and preventing code-injection attacks (e.g., [59, 20, 60, 67, 18, 55, 86, 93, 105]).
Interestingly, a related class of attacks exists but has not yet, as far as we’re aware, been
explored. These related attacks have many of the symptoms of code-injection attacks but don’t
involve injecting code. Because these attacks are performed by injecting noncode symbols, we
call them noncode-injection attacks. Although noncode-injection attacks don’t involve injecting
malicious code, they may cause other parts of the output program to execute maliciously. For
example, the following web app2 is vulnerable to noncode-injection attacks.
$attackerControlledString = input();
$code = ‘‘\\$data = ‘$attackerControlledString’; ’’
. ‘‘securityCheck(); \\$data .= ‘&f=exit#’;\n f();’’;
eval($code);
On a benign input such as Hello!, this application outputs the following.
$data = ‘Hello!’; securityCheck(); $data .= ‘&f=exit#’;\n f();
This output program sets $data to a value, calls the securityCheck() function, appends
a string to $data, and then invokes the f function. However, if an attacker enters the string \, the
application outputs the following program.
$data = ‘\‘; securityCheck(); $data .= ’&f=exit#’;\n f();
No code has been injected in this alternative output program; the injected \ is part of a
(noncode) string literal. However, because the injected symbol escapes the apostrophe that would
have terminated the first string literal, the string literal continues until the next (non-escaped)
apostrophe. As a result, the call to securityCheck is bypassed, the function f is updated to be
2

We’re grateful to Mike Samuel of Google for creating the first version of this example.
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the exit function, and finally, because # begins a comment that continues until the line break, the
exit function (i.e., f) is invoked, shutting down the web server and causing a denial of service.
4.2

Existing Solutions
Although much effort has been made to understand and prevent injection attacks, the

previous work in this area has focused on code-injection attacks.
Conventionally, code-injection attacks are considered to occur whenever an application’s
input alters the intended syntactic structure of its output program. Bisht, Madhusudan, and
Venkatakrishnan call this “a well-agreed principle in other works on detecting SQL injection” [15].
Indeed, this definition has appeared in many documents: [20, 93, 55, 108, 53, 11, 110, 86, 60, 18, 15,
67]. Although a few papers define CIAOs in other ways (e.g., CIAOs occur exactly when keywords
or operators get injected, including apostrophes used to form string values in SQL [84, 52], or when
injected strings span multiple tokens [113]), the conventional definition dominates the literature.
However, the conventional definition of code-injection attacks has inherent problems: some
code-injection attacks do not alter the syntactic structures of output programs, while some nonattacks do. To illustrate these problems, Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 discuss the conventional definitions
of code-injection attacks used by SqlCheck [108, 110] and Candid [11, 15].
4.2.1

SqlCheck
SqlCheck considers the intended syntactic structure of an output program to be any parse

tree in which each injected input is the complete derivation of one terminal or nonterminal. For example, parsing the output program SELECT balance FROM acct WHERE password=‘’ OR 1=1 - -’
produces a parse tree in which the injected symbols ’ OR 1=1 - - are not the complete sequence
of leaves for a single terminal or nonterminal ancestor; SqlCheck therefore recognizes this CIAO.
However, some of what SqlCheck considers intended (i.e., non-attack) structures are
actually attacks. For example, parsing the output program SELECT balance FROM acct WHERE
pin=exit() produces a tree in which the input symbols exit() are the complete sequence of leaves
for a single nonterminal (function-call) ancestor. Hence, SqlCheck does not recognize this CIAO
41

as an attack. Similarly, an output program of the form ...WHERE flag=1000>GLOBAL wouldn’t be
recognized as an attack, despite the injection of a greater-than operator (which may allow an attacker to efficiently extract the value of the GLOBAL variable, by performing a binary search over its
range). Although SqlCheck allows policy engineers to specify a set of terminal and nonterminal
ancestors that inputs may derive from—so engineers could disallow inputs derived as function-call
and comparison expressions—it’s unclear how an engineer would know exactly which ancestors to
allow derivations from. Moreover, engineers may wish to sometimes allow, and sometimes disallow,
inputs to derive from particular terminals and nonterminals, which is impossible in SqlCheck.
Conversely, some of what SqlCheck considers unintended (i.e., attack) structures are
actually not attacks. For example, an application might input two strings, a file name f and a file
extension e, and concatenate them to generate the program SELECT * FROM properties WHERE
filename=‘f.e’. Although the user has injected no code, SqlCheck flags this output as a codeinjection attack because the user’s inputs are not complete sequences of leaves for a single terminal
or nonterminal ancestor. In this case, the immediate ancestor of the user’s inputs would (assuming
a typical grammar) be a string literal, but neither of the user’s inputs form a complete string
literal—they’re missing the dot and single-quote symbols.
The Candid papers describe other, lower-level problems with SqlCheck’s definitions [11,
15].

4.2.2

Candid
Candid considers the intended syntactic structure of an output program, generated by

running application A on input I, to be whatever syntactic structure is present in the output of
A on input VR(I). Here VR is a (valid representation) function that converts any input I into
an input I 0 known to (1) be valid (i.e., non-CIAO-inducing) and (2) cause A to follow the same
control-flow path as it would on input I. Candid begins by assuming this VR function exists,
while acknowledging that it does not; in this basic case, Candid defines a CIAO to occur when
A’s output on input I has a different syntactic structure from A’s output on input VR(I).

42

Besides the nonexistence of function VR, there are some problems with this definition of
code-injection attacks. First, the definition is circular; the attacks are defined in terms of VR,
which itself is assumed to output non-code-injection-attack-inducing inputs (i.e., the definition of
code-injection attacks relies on the definition of VR, which relies on the definition of code-injection
attacks). Second, the definition assumes that multiple valid syntactic structures cannot exist. For
example, suppose VR(‘,’)=aaa and application A on input ‘,’ outputs SELECT * FROM t WHERE
name IN (‘a’,‘b’), while A on input aaa executes in the same way to output SELECT * FROM t
WHERE name IN (‘aaaab’). Both of these outputs are valid SQL programs, yet the programs have
different syntactic structures (a two-element list versus a single-element list), and neither exhibits
a CIAO (in no case has code been injected; only values, which take no steps dynamically, have been
injected). Candid would classify the non-CIAO input of ‘,’ as an attack in this case.
To deal with the nonexistence of function VR, Candid attempts to approximate VR by
defining VR(I) to be 1 when I is an integer and a|I| when I is a string (where a|I| is a sequence
of a’s having the same length as I). Supplying a concrete definition of VR resolves the circularity
problem in Candid’s basic definition of CIAOs, but it doesn’t resolve the second problem described
in the previous paragraph (that multiple valid syntactic structures may exist).
Moreover, Candid’s approximation of VR creates new problems:
• The approximation incorrectly assumes a string of a’s or a 1 could never be attack inputs.
An application could inject an input a or 1 into an output program as part of a function
call, field selection, or even keyword (e.g., and), all of which could be code-injection attacks.
For example, suppose an application outputs a constant string, echoes its input, and then
outputs parentheses; on input exit it outputs the program ...pin=exit(). Candid would
not recognize this code-injection attack because the application outputs ...pin=aaaa() on
input aaaa, which has the same syntactic structure as the ...pin=exit() output. The
problem here is that aaaa is actually an attack input for this application.
• The approximation may also cause benign inputs to be detected as attacks. For example,
suppose an application outputs SELECT * FROM t WHERE flag=TRUE on input TRUE, and
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follows the same control-flow path to output SELECT * FROM t WHERE flag=aaaa on input
VR(TRUE)=aaaa. Because these two output programs have different syntactic structures (a
boolean literal versus a variable identifier), Candid would flag the input TRUE as an attack,
even though the user has injected no code.
• The approximation can also break applications, as discussed in [15]. To illustrate this problem, let’s consider the application if(input<2) then restart() else output(1/(input1)). Candid cannot in general operate on this application because it evaluates applications on both actual (I) and candidate (VR(I)) inputs, while following the control-flow
path required to evaluate the actual input. In this case, whenever the application’s actual
input is greater than one, Candid will try to evaluate 1/(input-1) on the candidate input
1, which causes the application to halt with a divide-by-zero error, despite there being no
errors in Candid’s absence.
It could be argued that the example applications in the bullets above would be uncommon
in practice. But limiting the definition of code-injection attacks to common applications obligates
us to define what makes an application common, so we can test whether a given application is
“common” enough for the definition of code-injection attacks to apply. Even then, one couldn’t
say anything about code-injection attacks in uncommon applications.

4.2.3

CIAOs
Still other work detects code-injection attacks based on whether untrusted inputs get used

as non-values (i.e., non-normal-form terms) in output programs [94]. Although we believe that
this technique detects code-injection attacks precisely (i.e., lacks false positives and negatives),
it is tailored to code-injection attacks and cannot detect noncode-injection attacks. Hence, false
negatives arise when using the techniques of [94] to detect noncode-injection attacks. In contrast,
this dissertation presents definitions and techniques for precisely detecting general injection attacks,
including noncode-injection attacks.
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4.2.4

Parameterized Queries
In practice, a commonly recommended technique for preventing injection attacks is to use

parameterized queries [109], wherein applications create output programs containing placeholders,
or “holes”, for untrusted inputs. For example, an application might create an output program that
has a single placeholder for a string literal; to output a program, the application provides a string
to fill that placeholder. In this way, parameterized queries can limit injections to filling in holes
for string, numeric, or other kinds of literals, thus preventing both code- and noncode-injection
attacks.
While effective at preventing injection attacks, parameterized queries have significant disadvantages:
• Although parameterized queries are a standard feature of many SQL dialects, they are not
supported by other common output-program languages such as HTML or bash. An outputprogram language must provide support for parameterized queries before an application can
use them.
• It’s the responsibility of application programmers to use parameterized queries. Unfortunately, many application programmers are not doing so, as evidenced by the prevalence of
injection vulnerabilities [79, 85, 89].
• Once the decision to use parameterized queries is made, modifying existing applications
to use them is a manual, time-consuming process. Application programmers must find all
possible ways for programs to be output, and replace those programs with new versions
containing the appropriate placeholders. If even one output program is not replaced, the
application will remain vulnerable to injection attacks.

4.3

A Novel Technique for Preventing Injection Attacks
To address the problems with existing solutions for injection attacks, this dissertation

presents a new definition of injection attacks, one that includes both code- and noncode-injection
attacks. The definition of injection attacks is based on whether untrusted inputs affect output
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programs in any way besides inserting or expanding noncode tokens (such as string, integer, or
float literals). When untrusted inputs only insert or expand noncode tokens in an output program,
we say that the output program satisfies the NIE property (Noncode Insertion or Expansion). On
the other hand, if inputs affect an output program beyond inserting or expanding noncode tokens,
we say that the output program exhibits a BroNIE (Broken NIE).
The NIE property restricts untrusted inputs in ways that are similar to parameterized
queries; both techniques require untrusted inputs to fill noncode-token “holes” in output programs.
With parameterized queries, the holes for untrusted-input tokens are manually specified by application programmers; with this dissertation’s techniques, all holes for untrusted-input tokens are
automatically confined to being noncode (e.g., a string or numeric literal). Because this dissertation’s techniques are widely applicable and require no modifications to existing applications, the
techniques avoid the disadvantages of parameterized queries. However, this dissertation’s techniques rely on runtime monitoring for injection-attack detection, implying higher runtime overhead
than parameterized queries.
This section formalizes criteria for determining when a BroNIE has occurred.

4.3.1

Notation and Assumptions
An application vulnerable to BroNIEs outputs programs in some language L (e.g., SQL)

that has a finite concrete-syntax alphabet ΣL (e.g., the set of printable Unicode characters). These
output programs, which we also call L-programs, are finite sequences of ΣL symbols that each form
an element of L. For L-program p = σ1 σ2 ..σn , let |p| = n and p[i] = σi . For a sequence S, the
replacement of item t with item t0 (i.e., the substitution of t0 for t in S) is denoted [t0 /t]S.
This paper makes a few assumptions about output-program languages. All output-program
languages under consideration have well-defined functions for:
• Computing the free variables of program terms. Terms are called open if they contain free
variables (e.g., 1+x), and are otherwise closed (e.g., 1+2).
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• Testing whether program terms are values. Values are the “fully evaluated” terms of a
programming language, such as literals, pointers, objects, lists and tuples of other values,
lambda terms, etc.
• Tokenizing output programs. Function tokenizeL (σ1 ..σn ) returns the sequence of tokens
within the string σ1 ..σn (assuming σ1 ..σn is lexically valid; otherwise, tokenizeL (σ1 ..σn )
returns the empty sequence). A token of kind τ composed of symbols σi ..σj is represented
as τi (σi ..σj )j . For example, for program q = SELECT * FROM orders WHERE s=‘’ OR i<3,
tokenizeSQL (q) returns tokens SELECT 1 (SELECT)6 , ST AR8 (*)8 , F ROM 10 (FROM)13 ,
ID15 (orders)20 , W HERE 22 (WHERE)26 , ID28 (s)28 , EQU ALS 29 (=)29 , ST RIN G30 (‘’)31 ,
OR33 (OR)34 , ID36 (i)36 , LESS 37 (<)37 , and IN T 38 (3)38 . Predicate T RL (p, i) (tokenizerremoved) holds iff i is not within the bounds of any token in tokenizeL (p). For example,
T RSQL (q, i) holds for all i ∈ {7, 9, 14, 21, 27, 32, 35}.
This dissertation omits the L subscript from the tokenizeL and T RL functions when the outputprogram language is clear from context. Also, because all tokens are labeled with begin and
end indices, it’s trivial to convert a set of nonoverlapping tokens into the equivalent sequence of
tokens (and vice versa). This paper therefore treats sequences of tokens as sets, and vice versa, as
convenient.

4.3.2

Defining Injection
Applications vulnerable to BroNIEs output programs based on inputs from trusted and

untrusted sources. Injected symbols are those that originate from untrusted sources and propagate unmodified through an application into its output program. A BroNIE occurs when injected
symbols affect output programs in any way besides inserting or expanding noncode tokens.
We rely on the well-studied concept of taint tracking [52, 83, 113, 93, 105] to determine which
output-program symbols originate from untrusted sources and are therefore injected. At a high
level, a taint-tracking application works by replacing all symbols input from untrusted sources with
their tainted versions and preserving these taint metadata during all copy and output operations.
Provided that the application only taints symbols when they are being input from an untrusted
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source, and never untaints symbols, the injected symbols in the output program are exactly those
that are tainted. As we have been underlining injected symbols, we use the same notation to mark
tainted symbols.
Definition

16.

For

all

alphabets

Σ,

the

tainted-symbol

alphabet

Σ

is

{σ | σ ∈ Σ ∨ (∃σ 0 ∈ Σ : σ = σ 0 )}.
Definition 17. For all languages L with alphabet Σ, the tainted output language L with alphabet
Σ is {σ1 ..σn | ∃σ10 ..σn0 ∈L: ∀i∈{1..n}: (σi =σi0 ∨ σi =σi0 )}.
Definition 18. For all alphabets Σ and symbols σ ∈ Σ, the predicate injected(σ) is true iff σ 6∈ Σ.
For example, taint-tracking application output(‘Hello’ + input() + ‘!’) on untrusted
input World will output the program Hello World! because the initial input is replaced by its
tainted version World, and the taint metadata are preserved by the string-concatenation and output
operations.
Because taint tracking is a well-studied technique, the remainder of this dissertation assumes
that applications can track taints and thus output programs in which the injected (i.e., tainted)
symbols are underlined.

4.3.3

Defining Noncode
Intuitively, noncode symbols in output programs are those that are dynamically passive;

they specify no computation to be performed during execution. Code symbols, on the other hand,
are dynamically active; they specify computation that could be performed during execution.
This paper considers a program’s noncode symbols to be exactly those that are either (1)
removed by the tokenizer or (2) within a closed value:
1. Although previous work sometimes allowed tokenizer-removed symbols such as whitespace
or comments to be code [94], we believe that, because tokenizer-removed symbols are dynamically passive and cannot specify computation, it is more intuitive and accurate to
consider such symbols noncode.
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2. Closed values are operationally irreducible and thus specify no dynamic computation. Typical values include literals, pointers, objects, and tuples of other values. Open values are
excluded because they specify the dynamic computation of substituting a term for a free
variable during execution.
When p[i] is noncode (where p is an output program), we write N oncode(p, i). Otherwise,
we write Code(p, i).
Definition 19. For all L-programs p = σ1 ..σn and position numbers i ∈ {1..|p|}, predicate
N oncode(p, i) holds iff T RL (p, i) or there exist low and high symbol-position numbers l∈{1..i},
h∈{i..|p|} such that σl ..σh is a closed value in p.
Tokens composed entirely of noncode symbols are called noncode tokens. The set of all
noncode tokens in a program p is noncodeT oks(p).

4.3.4

An Aside: Defining Code-injection Attacks
Using the predicates for determining which symbols are injected (Definition 18), and which

are noncode (Definition 19), we can define Code-Injection Attacks on Output programs (CIAOs)
as occurring exactly when an output program contains an injected code symbol.
Definition 20. A CIAO occurs exactly when a taint-tracking application outputs L-program p =
σ1 ..σn such that ∃i∈{1..n} : (injected(σi ) ∧ Code(p, i)).
4.3.5

Defining BroNIEs
Because BroNIEs occur when injected symbols affect output programs beyond inserting or

expanding noncode tokens, they can be detected by observing how a program’s sequence of tokens
is affected by the removal of its injected symbols. Intuitively, removing all injected symbols from
the output program should only affect the sequence of tokens in the following ways:
1. Some noncode tokens may no longer be present.
2. Some noncode tokens may become smaller but should not change kind (e.g., string literals
should not become integer literals).
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To formalize this intuition, we need to consider the sequence of tokens obtained by removing
all injected symbols from an output program. The injected symbols cannot simply be deleted; doing
so would affect the indices of tokens that follow the injected symbols. Instead, each injected symbol
is replaced with an ε (the empty string). The sole purpose of an ε symbol is to hold the place of an
injected symbol; ε’s are otherwise ignored. Because the resulting string contains only uninjected
symbols, it can be considered a template of the program.
Definition 21. The template of a program p, denoted [ε/σ]p, is obtained by replacing each injected
symbol in p with an ε.
For example, let program r = 123+1. Then [ε/σ]r is ε2ε+1 (which is equivalent to 2+1) and
contains the tokens IN T 2 (2)2 , P LU S 4 (+)4 , and IN T 5 (1)5 .
The definition of BroNIEs also relies on notions of token insertion and expansion. Token
insertion is straightforward, but we need to be clear about the meaning of token expansion: injected
symbols may expand noncode tokens by increasing their ranges of indices and corresponding strings
of program symbols.
Definition 22. A token t = τi (v)j can be expanded into token t0 = τ 0 i0 (v 0 )j 0 , denoted t  t0 , iff (1)
τ =τ 0 , (2) i0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ j 0 , and (3) v is a subsequence of v 0 .
Whether the  operator refers to execution prefixing or token expansion will always be
clear from context.
Returning to the example above, token IN T 2 (2)2 in [ε/σ]r can be expanded into token
IN T 1 (123)3 in r. That is, IN T 2 (2)2  IN T 1 (123)3 .
We can now formally specify when an output program exhibits only noncode insertion or
expansion (NIE). Given a program p and its template [ε/σ]p, it should be possible to get to the
sequence of tokens in p from the sequence of tokens in [ε/σ]p by only inserting or expanding noncode
tokens. If the sequence of tokens in p can be reached from the sequence of tokens [ε/σ]p in this
way, we say that p satisfies the NIE property; otherwise it exhibits a BroNIE.
Definition 23. An L-program p satisfies the NIE property iff there exist:
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• I⊆noncodeT oks(p) (i.e., a set of p’s inserted noncode tokens),
• n ∈ N (i.e., a number of p’s expanded noncode tokens),
• {t1 ..tn }⊆tokenize([ε/σ]p) (i.e., a set of template tokens to be expanded), and
• {t01 ..t0n }⊆noncodeT oks(p) (i.e., a set of p’s expanded noncode tokens)
such that:
• t1  t01 , . . . , tn  t0n , and
• tokenize(p) = ([t01 /t1 ]..[t0n /tn ]tokenize([ε/σ]p)) ∪ I.
Definition 24. A BroNIE (Broken NIE) occurs exactly when a taint-tracking application outputs
a program that violates the NIE property.

4.4

Demonstrations of the BroNIE Definition
Let us consider several examples of how Definition 24 classifies programs as either attacks or

non-attacks. Although all but one of this section’s examples are presented in SQL, the underlying
concepts apply to other languages as well.

4.4.1

Example 1
Consider the following simple output program.
SELECT * FROM files WHERE numEdits > 0 AND name=‘file.ext’

This query returns files named file.ext that have been edited at least once. Figure 4.1 shows how
this program and its template are tokenized. This program does not exhibit a CIAO; all injected
symbols are part of integer or string values. Neither is it a BroNIE; the injected symbols only
cause noncode insertion and expansion, as depicted in Figure 4.1. More formally, the sequence
of tokens in the template can be made into the sequence of tokens in the program by inserting
the noncode token IN T 38 (0)38 and expanding the token ST RIN G49 (‘.’)58 into the (noncode)
token ST RIN G49 (‘file.ext’)58 . Hence, the definition of BroNIEs matches our intuition that
this program does not exhibit an attack.
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SELECT * FROM files WHERE numEdits > 0 AND name=‘file.ext’
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SELECT * FROM files WHERE numEdits > ε AND name=‘εεεε.εεε’
Figure 4.1. A depiction of how the Example-1 program and its template are tokenized. The program
is on the top, the template on the bottom, and noncode tokens are shaded.
SELECT balance FROM accts WHERE pw=‘’ OR 1=1 --’
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SELECT balance FROM accts WHERE pw=‘ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε’
Figure 4.2. A depiction of how the Example-2 program and its template are tokenized. The program
is on the top, the template on the bottom, and noncode tokens are shaded.

4.4.2

Example 2
Turning our attention to programs that do exhibit injection attacks, let’s return to the first

malicious output program presented in Section 4.1.
SELECT balance FROM accts WHERE pw=‘’ OR 1=1 --’
This query returns all balances from the accts table because the WHERE clause is a tautology. The
application that output this program tries to access only balances for which a password is known,
but the malicious input circumvents the password check.
Figure 4.2 shows how this program and its template are tokenized. The program exhibits
a CIAO and a BroNIE: a CIAO because the injected O, R, and = symbols are code, and a BroNIE
because the injected symbols insert code tokens and contract the ST RIN G36 (‘’)48 token into
ST RIN G36 (‘’)37 .
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SELECT * FROM t WHERE c=‘‘‘ AND now()<exp --this code is smokin’
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SELECT * FROM t WHERE c=‘ε’ AND now()<exp --this code is smokin’
Figure 4.3. A depiction of how the Example-3 program and its template are tokenized. The program
is on the top, the template on the bottom, and noncode tokens are shaded.

4.4.3

Example 3
Because injections that cause CIAOs must also cause BroNIEs (as will be shown in The-

orem 7), the remainder of this section focuses on non-CIAO examples of BroNIEs, such as the
following.
SELECT * FROM t WHERE c=‘‘‘ AND now()<exp --this code is smokin’
The application that outputs this program attempts to find all unexpunged records with a given
column value. For instance, the application could be querying a table of juvenile crimes (such as
truancy) that can legally only be displayed when the offenders are not yet adults. However, the
application appends a seemingly harmless, boastful comment to all output queries that allows an
injected apostrophe to circumvent the expungement check by escaping the string literal’s terminator
(in SQL, apostrophes within string literals are escaped by a second apostrophe). If the attacker
has control over the column being queried (e.g., it could be a comment column), then he or she can
illegally access records after they have been expunged.
Figure 4.3 presents the tokenizations of this example program and its template. This
program does not exhibit a CIAO; the injected symbol is part of a noncode (string) token. On the
other hand, this program does exhibit a BroNIE; the injected symbol violates the NIE property by
deleting code tokens.

4.4.4

Example 4
The following output program also contains a non-CIAO BroNIE.
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INSERT INTO users VALUES (‘evilDoer’, TRUE)--’, FALSE)
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INSERT INTO users VALUES (‘ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε ε’, FALSE)
Figure 4.4. A depiction of how the Example-4 program and its template are tokenized. The program
is on the top, the template on the bottom, and noncode tokens are shaded. The tokens for commas
and parentheses are considered noncode because they are within a tuple value; tuple terms are
values when all subterms are values.
INSERT INTO users VALUES (‘evilDoer’, TRUE)--’, FALSE)
This program creates a new user by inserting a record into the users table. Each record contains a
field for the username and a boolean flag indicating whether the user has administrator privileges.
By hardcoding a FALSE value for the second element of new-user records, the application that
output this program attempts to ensure that all accounts it creates do not have administrator
privileges. However, in this case an attacker has supplied a malicious username that causes the
application to create an administrator-privileged account.
Figure 4.4 shows how this program and its template are tokenized. None of the injected
symbols in the program are code symbols, so it does not exhibit a CIAO. However, it does exhibit
a BroNIE; the injected symbols cause noncode contraction and deletion. For example, the last
three noncode tokens in the template are not present in the output program. Thus, Definition 24
correctly considers this output program to be an attack.

4.4.5

Example 5
The following output program will serve as a final example of a non-CIAO BroNIE in SQL.
INSERT INTO trans VALUES (1,- 5E-10);
INSERT INTO trans VALUES (2, 5E+5)

Here, an intern-authored application outputs programs to handle money transfers from one account
(e.g., account number 1) to another (e.g., account number 2). The application applies a service
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INSERT INTO trans VALUES (1,- 5E-10); INSERT INTO trans VALUES (2, 5E+5)
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INSERT INTO trans VALUES (ε,- εε-10); INSERT INTO trans VALUES (ε, εε+5)
Figure 4.5. A depiction of how the Example-5 program and its template are tokenized. The program
is on the top, the template on the bottom, and noncode tokens are shaded. The tokens for commas
and parentheses are considered noncode because they are within a tuple value; tuple terms are
values when all subterms are values.
charge of $10 to the paying account, but is currently running a special that transfers an extra $5 into
the receiving account. However, by appending an ‘E’ to the money transfer amount, a malicious
user can drastically affect the transfer process—in the above program, the paying account is only
charged $0.0000000005 while the receiving account is credited $500,000.
Figure 4.5 shows that this output program exhibits a non-CIAO BroNIE. The output program does not exhibit a CIAO because no code has been injected; only components of float literals
have been injected. On the other hand, the output program does exhibit a BroNIE because the
injections delete the M IN U S 33 (-)33 and P LU S 70 (+)70 tokens and transform two IN T tokens into
F LOAT tokens (recall that Definition 22 does not allow tokens of one kind to expand into tokens
of another kind).

4.4.6

Example 6
To demonstrate the effectiveness of these techniques in other languages, we return to the

following output program from Section 4.1.
$data = ‘\‘; securityCheck(); $data .= ’&f=exit#’;\n f();
Because apostrophes within string literals are escaped by backslashes in this language, the injected
symbol bypasses the call to the securityCheck function, garbles the contents of the data variable,
and causes the exit function to be invoked instead of the f function.
The tokenizations of this program and its template are depicted in Figure 4.6. The program
does not exhibit a CIAO; the only injected symbol is part of a string literal (i.e., a noncode value).
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$data = ‘\‘; securityCheck(); $data .= ’&f=exit#’;\n f();
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$data = ‘ε’; securityCheck(); $data .= ‘&f=exit#’;\n f();
Figure 4.6. A depiction of how the Example-6 program and its template are tokenized. The program
is on the top, the template on the bottom, and noncode tokens are shaded.

However, the program does exhibit a BroNIE; the injected symbol deletes code and noncode tokens,
and inserts code tokens, thus violating the NIE property.

4.5

Analysis of the BroNIE Definition
This section explores implications of the definitions in Section 4.3.

4.5.1

Relationship between, and Prevalence of, CIAOs and BroNIEs
Every application vulnerable to CIAOs is also vulnerable to BroNIEs.

Theorem 7. If a program exhibits a CIAO, then it exhibits a BroNIE.
Proof. Let p be an output program that exhibits a CIAO. Then at least one of p’s code symbols is
injected; let σc be one of these injected code symbols and t be the token containing σc . Program p
satisfies the NIE property iff the sequence of tokens in [ε/σ]p can be made equal to the sequence
of tokens in p, subject to the constraints of Definition 23. Observe that t cannot be in [ε/σ]p; no
token in [ε/σ]p can have the same text as t unless its begin and/or end indices are different because,
in [ε/σ]p, σc will be replaced by an ε. Because t is a code token (it contains the code symbol σc ),
Definition 23 does not allow t to be inserted into the token sequence of [ε/σ]p, nor for a token in
[ε/σ]p to be expanded into t. Hence, the sequence of tokens in [ε/σ]p cannot be made equal to
the sequence of tokens in p by only inserting and/or expanding noncode tokens, so p exhibits a
BroNIE.
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Theorem 8 provides a formal basis for the widely-accepted rule of thumb that it’s unsafe to
use unvalidated input during query construction [109, 102]. It states that if an application always
includes an untrusted input (im ) verbatim in its output (without even inspecting the input), and
the same application has some input (v1 , .., vn ) for which it outputs a valid SQL program, then
there exists a way to construct an attack input (am ) such that the application’s output will exhibit
a CIAO and therefore a BroNIE. Theorem 8 is a generalization of Theorem 9 in [94], which was
limited to CIAOs in an idealized subset of SQL called SQL Diminished; in contrast, Theorem 8
below applies to full SQL.
Theorem 8. For all n-ary functions A and (n-1)-ary functions A0 and A00 , if ∀i1 , .., in : A(i1 , .., in ) =
A0 (i1 , .., im−1 , im+1 , .., in )im A00 (i1 , .., im−1 , im+1 , .., in ), where 1 ≤ m ≤ n, and ∃v1 , .., vn : (vm ∈Σ+
SQL ∧
A(v1 , .., vn ) ∈ SQL), then ∃a1 , .., an : A(a1 , .., an ) ∈ SQL and A(a1 , .., an ) exhibits a CIAO and a
BroNIE.
Proof. Observe that changing vm to any am , without changing any of the other inputs to A, will
cause A to output the same program but with am instead of vm , because A0 and A00 are independent
of im . Now construct am as follows:
am = vm A00 (v1 , .., vm−1 , vm+1 , .., vn )\n; drop table t; A0 (v1 , .., vm−1 , vm+1 , .., vn )vm

.

This construction causes A(v1 , .., vm−1 , am , vm+1 , .., vn ) to output the string p

=

A(v1 , .., vn )\n; drop table t; A(v1 , .., vn ). Because A(v1 , .., vn ) ∈ SQL, so too is output-program
p. By Definition 20, p exhibits a CIAO due to the injected DROP statement, as well as any other
code symbols in am . By Theorem 7, p also exhibits a BroNIE.
It is also straightforward to prove, using the same techniques from [94], that neither static
nor black-box mechanisms can precisely prevent BroNIEs. That is, precise detection of BroNIEs
requires dynamic, white-box mechanisms.
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4.5.2

An Algorithm for Precisely Detecting BroNIEs
Given that applications commonly fail to validate untrusted inputs [102], it would be bene-

ficial to have mechanisms for automatically preventing injection attacks. At a high level, BroNIEs
can be precisely and automatically prevented by:
• instrumenting the target application with a taint-tracking mechanism,
• interposing between the target application and the environment that evaluates the application’s output programs,
• detecting whether output programs satisfy the NIE property, and
• only executing programs that do not exhibit BroNIEs.
Algorithm 4.7 is a psuedocode implementation of this mechanism. The algorithm detects
BroNIEs by iterating through the sequences of tokens in the output program and its template while
ensuring that the two token streams can be made equal subject to the constraints of Definition 23
(i.e., by only inserting noncode tokens into, or expanding noncode tokens within, the program’s
template).
Theorem 9. Algorithm 4.7 executes program p iff p doesn’t exhibit a BroNIE.
Proof. We prove the if direction; the only-if direction is similar. By assumption, p satisfies the NIE
property. Hence, the sequence of tokens in [ε/σ]p can be made equal to the sequence of tokens in p
by expanding tokens in [ε/σ]p into noncode tokens in p, and/or inserting noncode tokens in p into
[ε/σ]p. Variables i and j are initialized to 1. For every token present in p and [ε/σ]p, both i and
j will be incremented by the first branch of the if statement (Line 7). For every token in [ε/σ]p
that needs to be expanded into a noncode token in p, i and j will be incremented by the second
branch of the if statement (Lines 8–9). For every noncode token in p that needs to be inserted
into [ε/σ]p, i will be incremented by either the third branch of the if statement (Line 10) or the
second while loop (Line 13). After both while loops have completed, both i and j will be greater
than the lengths of their token sequences, so p will be executed on Line 14.
58

Input: Taint-tracking application A and inputs T , U (trusted, untrusted)
Ensure: A’s output-program p is executed iff it doesn’t exhibit a BroNIE
1: p ← A (T , Taint(U ))
2: pgmT okens ← tokenize(p)
3: temT okens ← tokenize([ε/σ]p)
4: MarkNoncodeToks(pgmT okens)
5: i ← j ← 1
6: while i ≤ pgmT okens.length and j ≤ temT okens.length:
7:
if pgmT okens[i] = temT okens[j] then increment i and j
8:
else if pgmT okens[i].isNoncode and temT okens[j]  pgmT okens[i] then
9:
increment i and j
10:
else if pgmT okens[i].isNoncode then increment i
11:
else throw BronieException
12: // Handle any trailing noncode tokens in the program
13: while i ≤ pgmT okens.length and pgmT okens[i].isNoncode: increment i
14: if i > pgmT okens.length and j > temT okens.length then Execute(p)
15: else throw BronieException
Figure 4.7. A BroNIE-preventing mechanism.

Theorem 10. The BroNIE-detection part of Algorithm 4.7 (i.e., Lines 2–13) executes in O(n)
time, where n is the length of the output program.
Proof. Each call to tokenize executes in O(n) time and produces O(n) tokens. After the program
tokens are marked as either code or noncode (taking O(n) time), the two while loops execute;
each iteration takes constant time, and each loop executes O(n) times. Afterward, if a BroNIE
has not yet been detected, deciding whether a BroNIE has occurred takes constant time. Thus,
Algorithm 4.7 runs in O(n) time.

4.6

Preventing BroNIEs with Gray Policies and Silhouette Judges
With an improved understanding of which output programs exhibit injection attacks, we

now focus on writing gray policies that use the BroNIE definition.
We begin by defining the event set E. Events of interest include:
• emit(p): these events occur when applications output a program p.
• exec(p): these events occur when the runtime monitor allows a program p to be executed.
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• deny(p): these events occur when the runtime monitor prevents a program p from being
executed.
While applications may be capable of performing many other actions, these are the only events
that a runtime monitor dedicated to preventing injection attacks will interact with.
With the event set defined, gray properties and policies for preventing injection attacks can
be defined. Most straightforwardly, a property could reduce the security of a trace for each prefix
it has that ends with a BroNIE being executed. To handle the special case of infinite traces (which
may have an infinite number of such prefixes), the gray property is constructed to compute the
security value of each of the trace’s prefixes, and mapping the trace to the greatest lower bound of
these security values.

g1 (x) = inf

1
| x0  x
00
00
1 + |{x ; he, exec(p)i | x ; he, exec(p)i  x0 ∧ BroN IE(p)}|



As expected, if a trace x never executes a BroNIE, then g1 (x) = 1, and for every exchange in x
that does execute a BroNIE, g1 (x) decreases. Furthermore, every reduction in security occurs at
some finite point along the trace x. Thus, g1 is a gray safety property.
A similar construction punishes executions that deny non-BroNIE queries:

g2 (x) = inf

1
| x0  x
00
00
1 + |{x ; hemit(p), deny(p)i | x ; hemit(p), deny(p)i  x0 ∧ ¬BroN IE(p)}|



Again, this is a safety property; once an execution’s security has decreased, it cannot rise again.
One of the strengths of gray policies is that they provide many interesting options for
composing with each other. For example, the following gray policy combines g1 and g2 to punish
executions for both executing BroNIEs and not executing non-BroNIEs.

g3 (x) = w(g1 (x)) + (1 − w)(g2 (x))

Here, w ∈ R[0,1] represents the weight given to g1 ; when w = 0.5, g1 and g2 are weighted equally,
while higher (lower) values of w over- (under-) emphasize g1 compared to g2 . Other options for
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combining g1 and g2 into a single property include using the lower of g1 and g2 , or by multiplying
their security values.
g4 (x) = min(g1 (x), g2 (x))
g5 (x) = g1 (x) ∗ g2 (x)
Because g1 and g2 are both safety properties, so too are g3 , g4 , and g5 . Of these, g4 is the most
permissive, because it allows one property to misbehave “for free” whenever the other property
misbehaves. For example, if an application executes a BroNIE, then the application can then deny
a non-BroNIE without reducing its security.
The quantified nature of gray policies allows interesting ways of using the BroNIE definition
that do not rely on a BroN IE predicate. For example, Definition 23 forbids any difference in the
sequences of tokens in a program and its template; instead, a gray policy might count how many
“forbidden” edits are required to make the two sequences equal. To formalize this idea, let N IE ◦ (p)
be 1 when p satisfies Definition 23, and be decimated for every “forbidden” edit needed. Using this
notion, a gray property can be constructed that measures the severity of a trace’s output program
executions.
g6 (x) = inf {N IE ◦ (p) | he, exec(p)i ∈ x}
This gray property is also gray safety, because once a trace includes an unsafe execution, its security
can never rise. Unfortunately, even programs that only require a single “forbidden” edit can be
exceptionally malicious. As such, g6 is not recommended to prevent injection attacks; it is shown
here because a similar idea might be useful in other contexts.
Non-safety properties for preventing injection attacks can also be defined. For example, an
execution can be evaluated based on what ratio of its executed output programs are BroNIEs.

|{x00 ; he, exec(p)i | x00 ; he, exec(p)i  x0 ∧ ¬BroN IE(p)}|



|{x00 ; he, exec(p)i | x00 ; he, exec(p)i  x0 }|
g7 (x) =



1
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if x ∈ E ∗
otherwise

This property is a liveness property because any finite execution can increase its security by executing programs that are not BroNIEs.
Furthermore, non-property policies for injection attacks can be defined. Using the technique
presented in Section 3.2, the following policy measures an application’s capability of detecting
injection attacks.
G7 (X) = prob(x executes a BroNIE | x ∈ X) ∗
prob(x0 ∈ X | x0 ∈ E ∞ ∧ x0 does not execute a BroNIE)
This property is gray hyperliveness because any terminating target system can be made more secure
by extending it to include infinite-length executions that do not execute BroNIEs.
With a healthy collection of gray policies, we move on to defining silhouette judges. Recall
that gray policies are responsible for determining how secure target systems are, while silhouette
judges are responsible for encoding users’ security requirements. Thus, to define useful silhouette
judges, we must first consider the security requirements of users.
First, suppose a simple security requirement that no BroNIEs are allowed to execute. This
requirement can be encoded into a silhouette judge by requiring absolute security.

j1 (s) = s(∞) = 1

Combining j1 with the gray policy g1 (which only considers as absolutely secure traces that do not
execute BroNIEs) creates a black-and-white policy that forbids BroNIEs from executing. Similarly,
combining j1 with g2 creates a black-and-white policy that ensures non-BroNIEs are executed when
they are emitted.
This security requirement can be relaxed to instead ensure that security never dips below
some threshold value t.
j2 (s) = ∀x ∈ dom(s) : s(x) ≥ t
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For example, combining j2 with g5 will create a black-and-white policy that only allows some
number of mistakes from the output program (either executed BroNIEs or denied non-BroNIEs)
before disallowing further exchanges, depending on the values of t in j2 and w in g5 .
Other approaches could be used for allowing less secure traces. For example, the following
silhouette judge makes sure that no part of the silhouette is overly vulnerable; it uses a sliding
window of length n, and ensures that the average security inside of the window never dips below a
certain threshold t ∈ R[0,1] .

j3 (s) = ∀i ∈ N : i + n ∈ dom(s) ⇒


i+n 
X
s(i)
j=i

n

>t

Combining silhouette j3 with the gray policy g7 creates a gray property that allows executions to
occasionally execute BroNIEs, but if too many BroNIEs are executed in a short period of time, the
silhouette judge will intervene.
Along the same lines, a silhouette judge could only allow executions to stray below a security
threshold for short periods of time before returning to an acceptable security value.

j4 (s) = ∀i ∈ N : (i + n ∈ dom(s) ∧ s(i) < t) ⇒ (∃j ∈ {1..n} : s(i + j) ≥ t)

Silhouette judges for target systems by necessity are more complex, but allow for interesting
requirements. For example, a user might want to ensure that a target system become more secure
as it executes. However, there is no way to know which execution will occur at runtime, so the user
requires that all 2-length prefixes be more secure than all 1-length prefixes, and that all 3-length
prefixes are more secure than all 2-length prefixes, and so on.

J5 (S) = ∀(r1 , r2 ) ∈ {(0.1919.., 0.2929..), (0.2929.., 0.3939..), ...} : S(r1 ) < S(r2 )

Combining J5 with G7 creates a black-and-white policy that only allows target-systems that are
more precise in detecting BroNIEs as traces proceed. Such a policy would be useful for determining
the effectiveness of adaptive systems for injection-attack prevention.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS

This dissertation has presented a new model of formal security policies that allows specification of how secure target systems are, as opposed to the existing models which specify whether
systems are secure. The gray model is a proper generalization of the existing models, and as
demonstrated in Chapter 2, preserves several interesting qualities:
1. The only gray property that is both gray safety and gray liveness is the property that maps
every trace to the highest security value (Theorem 1).
2. Similarly, the only gray policy that is both gray hypersafety and gray hyperliveness is the
property that maps every target system to the highest security value (Theorem 2).
3. Every gray property can be expressed as the minimum of a single gray safety property and
a single gray liveness property (Theorem 3).
4. Similarly, every gray policy can be expressed as the minimum of a single gray hypersafety
property and a single gray hyperliveness property (Theorem 4).
As an added benefit, the gray model of policies can serve as a unifying framework for expressing security metrics. In Chapter 3, techniques for constructing gray policies out of existing
security metrics were explored. Security metrics from varied fields, including access control, confidentiality, privacy, and network security, were used to construct a large variety of gray policies.
Additionally, methods for usefully converting existing black-and-white policies to gray policies were
explored.

64

To further demonstrate the gray model, Chapter 4 delved into the topic of injection attacks.
Novel injection attacks which do not involve injecting code were explored, and problems in existing
solutions were discussed. The primary contributions include:
1. A definition of injection attack that avoids the problems of existing solutions (Definition 24).
2. A proof that this new definition correctly includes code-injection attacks (Theorem 7).
3. A proof that any application which blindly copies its untrusted inputs into its outputs will
be vulnerable to injection attacks (Theorem 8).
4. A linear-time algorithm for detecting and preventing injection attacks, with proofs of correctness and running time (Figure 4.7).
5. An exploration in Section 4.6 of how to model and prevent injection attacks using gray
policies and silhouette judges.

5.1

Future Work
Several directions exist for future work.
One would be to design and evaluate programming languages, or other tools, for specifying

gray policies and silhouette judges. As a part of this direction, it would be interesting to consider
case studies, to learn which sorts of gray policies and silhouette judges seem to be more common,
or practically useful.
Another direction would investigate generalizations of existing program-verification techniques, to transition from determining whether programs obey black-and-white policies to determining how well programs obey gray policies.
It would also be interesting to consider ways in which the gray security model could benefit
from results known in the area of fuzzy set theory. Intuitively, gray policies are to black-and-white
policies what fuzzy sets are to sets: A fuzzy set is an ordered pair (U, m), where U is a set and
m : U → R[0,1] is a membership function that describes the degree to which each element of U is
a member of the set [115]. Because of the similarity between gray policies and fuzzy sets, much
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of the work on fuzzy set theory is expected to translate to gray policies. For example, the “very”
operator takes a fuzzy set (U, m) and returns the fuzzy set (U, m2 ); such an operation is a simple
way to make gray policies stricter.
Further generalizations of gray policies may also be possible. For example, rather than the
totally ordered set of R[0,1] , gray policies could have complete lattices as their codomains. Some
alterations would need to be made to the gray model to handle such codomains, including replacing
infimum (supremum) operations with meet (join) operations.
Yet another direction is in the area of enforceability theory. As other work has delineated
the black-and-white properties enforceable by various mechanisms (e.g., [101, 64, 70, 38, 12, 37]), the
same could be done for gray properties and/or silhouette judges. This direction of research would
explore whether, and how well, different mechanisms (static code analyzers or runtime monitors,
possibly constrained in various ways) can enforce classes of gray properties and/or silhouette judges.
With regards to injection attacks, it would be interesting to evaluate the accuracy of existing
injection-attack-vulnerability databases. With an implementation of the ideas in Chapter 4, it
might be straightforward to examine such databases and determine if any of their allegedly malicious
inputs are actually benign, and what percentage of their allegedly benign inputs are actually attacks.
Furthermore, the definition of injection attack relies upon taint-tracking, and yet tainttracking mechanisms are either slow (e.g., bit-level taint tracking), unsound (e.g., limited to tracking
taints only within strings), or overly conservative (e.g., static flow analysis). Advances in the realm
of taint-tracking would make precisely preventing injection attacks more practical.
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[48] Enes Göktas, Elias Athanasopoulos, Herbert Bos, and Georgios Portokalidis. Out of control:
Overcoming control-flow integrity. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Security and Privacy,
pages 575–589, 2014.
[49] I. Goriac. Measuring anonymity with plausibilistic entropy. In Proceedings of the International
Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security, pages 151–160, Sept 2013.
[50] Vaibhav Gowadia, Csilla Farkas, and Marco Valtorta. PAID: A probabilistic agent-based
intrusion detection system. Computers and Security, 24(27):529–545, 2005.
[51] Christopher Griffin, Bharat Madan, and Kishor Trivedi. State space approach to security
quantification. In Proceedings of the Conference on Computer Software and Applications
Conference, COMPSAC-W’05, pages 83–88, 2005.
[52] William Halfond, Alex Orso, and Pete Manolios. Wasp: Protecting web applications using
positive tainting and syntax-aware evaluation. Transactions on Software Engineering (TSE),
34(1):65–81, 2008.

72

[53] William G.J. Halfond, Jeremy Viegas, and Alessandro Orso. A Classification of SQL-Injection
Attacks and Countermeasures. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Symposium on
Secure Software Engineering, March 2006.
[54] Joseph Y. Halpern and Kevin R. O’Neill. Anonymity and information hiding in multiagent
systems. Journal of Computer Security, 13(3):483–514, May 2005.
[55] Robert Hansen and Meredith Patterson. Stopping injection attacks with computational theory. In Black Hat Briefings Conference, 2005.
[56] Thomas Heumann, Sven Trpe, and Jrg Keller. Quantifying the attack surface of a web
application. In Proceedings of Sicherheit, volume 170, pages 305–316, 2010.
[57] Michael Howard, Jon Pincus, and Jeannette M. Wing. Measuring relative attack surfaces. In
Computer Security in the 21st Century, pages 109–137. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2005.
[58] Daniel C. Howe and Helen Nissenbaum. TrackMeNot: Resisting surveillance in web search.
In Lessons from the Identity Trail: Anonymity, Privacy, and Identity in a Networked Society,
chapter 23, pages 417–436. 2009.
[59] Nenad Jovanovic, Christopher Kruegel, and Engin Kirda. Precise alias analysis for static
detection of web application vulnerabilities. In Proceedings of the 2006 workshop on Programming languages and analysis for security, pages 27–36. ACM, 2006.
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